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MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AS WORKERS’ COMP:
OVERCOMING STATE CONSTITUTIONAL BARRIERS TO
TORT REFORM
Alexander Volokh∗
ABSTRACT
This Article discusses the intersection of torts, administrative law, and
constitutional law—a surprisingly understudied area, given its importance for
modern-day tort reform efforts.
In several states, based on perceptions of a medical malpractice liability
and insurance crisis, reformers have sought to abolish tort liability for medical
malpractice—replacing it with an administrative compensation system not
based on negligence and roughly similar to workers’ compensation.
Tort reformers have, in the past, been hindered by state courts that have
struck down damages caps and similar reforms on state constitutional theories.
Some of the main theories have been state constitutional jury trial rights,
access-to-courts rights, and due process/equal protection.
Surprisingly, it turns out that workers’-comp-like administrative systems,
though more radical than damages caps and similar reforms, seem to have a
better chance of being held constitutional—in part because of their similarities
with workers’ comp, which also abolished certain tort actions and replaced
them with a non-negligence-based administrative system, and which has been
universally held to be constitutional.
This Article analyzes the constitutionality of this sort of administrative
compensation system under the Florida, Alabama, and Georgia constitutions,
focusing on jury trial rights, access-to-courts rights, and due process/equal
protection.

∗
Associate Professor, Emory Law School, avolokh@emory.edu. I am grateful to Sarah M. Shalf for
her input and assistance. I conducted the bulk of this research on behalf of Patients for Fair Compensation, a
proponent of Georgia’s S.B. 141 and the similar Florida and Alabama bills described in this Article. I testified
on behalf of S.B. 141 before the Health and Human Services Committee of the Georgia Senate on October 22,
2013. See infra note 155. While Patients for Fair Compensation paid for the time I spent researching and
testifying, they did not exercise any control over the content of my work, and all opinions in my research and
testimony and in this Article are my own.
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INTRODUCTION
A surprising fact lives at the intersection of torts, administrative law, and
constitutional law. For years, many states have been striking down tort reform
measures on various state constitutional grounds, relying on rights that are
unknown to the Federal Constitution (like “access to justice” or “right to a
remedy”), rights that have been interpreted far beyond their federal
counterparts (like jury trial rights), or old-fashioned rights that state supreme
courts merely apply more rigorously than one might expect (like due process
or equal protection rights). In fact, it wouldn’t be unfair to think of state
constitutional law as the enemy of the modern tort reform movement.
In recent years, tort reformers have introduced a new sort of bill in various
state legislatures: one that would entirely abolish tort liability for medical
malpractice (med mal) injuries and replace it with an administrative
compensation system that looks more or less like the workers’ compensation
system.
This proposal is far more radical than the sorts of proposals, such as
damages caps or statutes of limitations, that have routinely been struck down.
And yet—at least in the states whose constitutional law I examine in this
Article—it is probably entirely constitutional.
The moral is that torts, state administrative law, and state constitutional law
intersect in interesting and unexpected ways. In particular, the story of
administrative med-mal compensation systems shows why we should all know
more state constitutional law.
* * *
First, torts. Medical malpractice has long been the subject of critical
inquiry.1 Critics have argued that lay juries, unqualified to opine on the
complicated question of whether doctors have been negligent—and moved by
hindsight bias and venal expert witnesses—hand down excessively large
damages verdicts. The fear of being found negligent drives the practice of
“defensive medicine,” whereby doctors order useless and costly tests to
insulate themselves from being second-guessed at trial. All this, in turn, drives

1
See F. Patrick Hubbard, The Nature and Impact of the “Tort Reform” Movement, 35 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 437, 469–70 (2006) (dating the med-mal-focused tort reform movement to the 1970s); see also infra
Section I.A.
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increases in medical malpractice insurance premiums and reduces the
availability of affordable medical care.2
Not all plaintiffs benefit from these large verdicts, though: the expense of
litigation means that many deserving plaintiffs with moderate claims can’t find
legal representation and thus go uncompensated; and even those who do get
compensation have to wait years.3
* * *
Defenders of the med-mal system have disputed these critiques, and the
empirical evidence is complicated.4 Still, these concerns—and broader
concerns related to tort law and civil liability more generally—have driven the
tort reform movement for the last forty years.5 The tort reform movement has
featured damages caps (whether on noneconomic or punitive damages),
alterations in the standard of proof for applying punitive damages (with several
states adopting a “clear and convincing evidence” standard), provisions
diverting all or a portion of punitive damages to the government, and so on.6
Some of these provisions have been targeted to medical malpractice; others
haven’t.
But one development is fairly new: the complete replacement of medical
malpractice tort liability with an administrative compensation system. (Or
perhaps everything old is new again—we’ve already seen something like this
in the 1910s, when most states replaced most employer–employee litigation

2
See, e.g., H.R. 739, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 766.403(1) (Fla. 2014) (giving reasons for the bill,
including defensive medicine); S. 141, 152d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 51-13-3 (Ga. 2013) (same); Patricia
M. Danzon, Liability for Medical Malpractice, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 1991, at 51, 60–63; Eric Helland &
Seth A. Seabury, Tort Reform and Physician Labor Supply: A Review of the Evidence, 42 INT’L REV. L. &
ECON. 192, 193, 199–200 (2015) (finding some evidence that noneconomic damages caps increase physician
supply in high-risk specialties); David A. Hyman et al., Does Tort Reform Affect Physician Supply? Evidence
from Texas, 42 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 203, 204, 212–13 (2015) (finding no evidence that tort reform in Texas
increased physician supply); Elizabeth Blair Weatherly, Legislative Summary, Senate Bill 141: Patient Injury
Act, 7 J. MARSHALL L.J. 183, 203–05 (2013) (describing sponsors’ arguments in favor of the Georgia bill);
Kathryn Zeiler, Medical Malpractice Liability Crisis or Patient Compensation Crisis?, 59 DEPAUL L. REV.
675, 679–80 (2010) (describing high jury awards and increasing insurance premiums).
3
See Ga. S. 141, § 51-13-3(a)(2)–(3); Weatherly, supra note 2, at 205.
4
See Zeiler, supra note 2, at 679–86 (describing some claims of tort reformers that are not supported
by evidence, some that are, and other claims where the evidence is mixed); see also infra Section I.A.
5
See, e.g., PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1988);
WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA UNLEASHED THE
LAWSUIT (1991); Hubbard, supra note 1, at 469–79.
6
See Hubbard, supra note 1, at 483–524; infra text accompanying notes 32–42.
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over workplace injuries with administrative workers’ compensation systems.)7
A typical example of such an administrative compensation system is the one
proposed in S.B. 141, the Patient Injury Act, introduced in 2013 in the Georgia
Senate but never enacted;8 similar bills have been introduced (but also never
enacted) in Florida and Alabama.9
The arguments against such schemes are mostly policy-based. For instance,
if one believes that the tort crisis or med-mal crisis is basically illusory, then
such an administrative compensation system is a solution in search of a
problem.10 (I myself express no position on the merits of these schemes in this
Article.) But one particular set of arguments relates to the constitutionality of
the system.11
* * *
This is how the first two pieces of the story—torts and administrative
law—get us to the third piece: constitutional law.
Constitutional law has often been the enemy of tort reform: damages caps
and similar measures have been struck down on constitutional grounds in many
states.12 But the roadblock to tort reform has not generally been the Federal
Constitution, but rather state constitutions, which contain provisions that either

7
See generally Richard A. Epstein, The Historical Origins and Economic Structure of Workers’
Compensation Law, 16 GA. L. REV. 775, 797–800 (1982) (discussing the English statute, the Workmen’s
Compensation Act of 1897, which “in many ways served as the model for the subsequent American statutes”);
Price V. Fishback & Shawn Everett Kantor, Did Workers Pay for the Passage of Workers’ Compensation
Laws?, 110 Q.J. ECON 713, 716–24 (1995) [hereinafter Fishback & Kantor, Did Workers Pay]; Price V.
Fishback & Shawn Everett Kantor, The Adoption of Workers’ Compensation in the United States, 1900–1930,
41 J.L. & ECON. 305, 314 (1998) [hereinafter Fishback & Kantor, Adoption of Workers’ Comp]. More recently,
examples of non-tort, insurance-like compensation systems have been mandatory no-fault auto insurance
schemes and the federal National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 to -34 (2012).
See Hubbard, supra note 1, at 469.
8
Ga. S. 141. The bill was introduced again as S.B. 86 in the 2015–2016 Regular Session, see SB 86
“Patient Compensation Act,” GA. GEN. ASSEMBLY, http://www.legis.ga.gov/legislation/en-US/Display/
20152016/SB/86 (last visited Mar. 7, 2018), but again not enacted.
9
See S. 413, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2016); H.R. 739, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2014); Alabama
Senate Bill 413, LEGISCAN, https://legiscan.com/AL/text/SB413/2016 (last visited Mar. 7, 2018) (noting that
the Alabama bill is dead); Florida House Bill 739, LEGISCAN, https://legiscan.com/FL/text/H0739/2014 (last
visited Mar. 7, 2018) (noting that the Florida bill died in the Judiciary Committee).
10
See Weatherly, supra note 3, at 207–09.
11
See id. at 206–07 (discussing the argument of former Georgia Attorney General Bowers).
12
See, e.g., J. Chase Bryan et al., Are Non-Economic Caps Constitutional?, 80 DEF. COUNS. J. 154, 154
(2013); Bryan A. Jones, Comment, The End of Tort Reform?: The Constitutional Battle Looms over
Mississippi, 80 MISS. L.J. SUPRA 87, 88, 97 (2011); see also infra Section I.B.
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are entirely unknown to the Federal Constitution or have been interpreted by
state supreme courts very differently from their federal counterparts.13
To give just a couple of recent examples: In Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery,
P.C. v. Nestlehutt, the Supreme Court of Georgia struck down a statute capping
noneconomic damages under the Georgia Constitution’s jury trial clause.14
And in Estate of McCall v. United States, the Florida Supreme Court struck
down a per-incident cap on noneconomic damages in a wrongful death case
arising from medical malpractice, holding that it was “arbitrary and unrelated
to a true state interest” and therefore violated the Florida Constitution’s Equal
Protection Clause.15
State constitutional law is an understudied area. The reasons are
understandable: We have fifty states but only one federal government.
Researching California con law might be about as easy as researching federal
constitutional law, but for one’s analysis to be interesting outside of a single
state, one will have to engage in comparative analysis, which is more timeconsuming and sounds (is?) more tedious than just understanding one national
jurisdiction. In part because of its national scope and in part because many
people already know something about the Federal Constitution,16 the U.S.
Supreme Court is more politically salient, more prestigious, and sexier.
This is an excuse for not knowing state constitutional law, but not a good
one. Justice William Brennan famously argued that state constitutions were a
“font of individual liberties” and that state courts should interpret their
constitutions to protect rights that the U.S. Supreme Court, interpreting the
Federal Constitution, would not.17 Indeed, he argued that the trend for states to
read their constitutions more broadly than the Federal Constitution—what state

13
One exception is the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses: as I explain below, see infra Part IV,
states usually have their own due process and equal protection provisions, and states often aren’t clear whether
their decisions are based on the federal or state clauses. So a state supreme court might strike down a state law
on due process or equal protection grounds, and its analysis might seem stricter than one would expect from a
federal court, but in some cases it might be hard to rigorously tell that analysis apart from a “rational basis with
teeth” theory that federal courts occasionally apply.
14
691 S.E.2d 218 (Ga. 2010).
15
134 So. 3d 894, 901 (Fla. 2014) (plurality opinion); see also id. at 919–20 (Pariente, J., concurring in
result).
16
But see Area Man Passionate Defender of What He Imagines Constitution to Be, ONION (Nov. 14,
2009, 8:02 AM), http://www.theonion.com/article/area-man-passionate-defender-of-what-he-imagines-c-2849.
17
William J. Brennan Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV.
489, 491 (1977).
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con-law scholars call the “New Judicial Federalism”18—was “the most
important development in constitutional jurisprudence of our times.”19
We needn’t praise state constitutions indiscriminately to recognize their
importance. Like federal con law, state con law has something for everyone.20
Some praise state constitutions’ potential to protect economic liberty through
substantive due process or to closely scrutinize governments’ claims that a
taking of property is for a public use.21 Those from a different philosophical
perspective praise state constitutional provisions that provide positive rights,
such as to government-supplied housing for the poor and equal public funding
for abortions as for childbirth.22 Like the Federal Constitution, state
constitutions can function both as heroic barriers to oppressive majoritarianism
and as unjustified obstructions to democratically enacted policy. Examining
state constitutional reactions to the recent wave of tort reform is a good case
study in an active area of law.
* * *
This Article’s interesting news is that—even in states that have had
significant anti-tort-reform doctrine and where tort reform measures have
recently been struck down—the new crop of administrative compensation
systems is likely fully constitutional. (Is this good or bad news? I report, you
decide.) The basic reason goes back to the 1910s, the age of workers’ comp.
Before workers’ comp laws, a worker injured on the job couldn’t recover
against his employer unless he could prove his employer’s negligence. Not
only was this expensive in itself, but various tort doctrines of the time—the

18
See, e.g., ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS (2009); Lawrence
Friedman, The Once and Future Constitutional Law: On The Law of American State Constitutions, 74 ALB. L.
REV. 1671, 1672 (2011). For a few examples of states reading their constitutions more broadly than the
Federal Constitution, even in areas where there is some overlap in subject matter, see ALEXANDER VOLOKH,
OVERPROTECTING PUBLIC EMPLOYEE PENSIONS: THE CONTRACT CLAUSE AND THE CALIFORNIA RULE (2014)
(discussing California’s and other states’ interpretation of state and federal contract clauses); David Schuman, The
Right to “Equal Privileges and Immunities”: A State’s Version of “Equal Protection,” 13 VT. L. REV. 221
(1988) (discussing Oregon’s equality jurisprudence).
19
State Constitutional Law, NAT’L L.J. (D.C.), Sept. 29, 1986, at S-1 (quoting Justice Brennan).
20
For a sense of the diversity of state constitutions, see G. Alan Tarr, Understanding State
Constitutions, 65 TEMPLE L. REV. 1169 (1992); Robert F. Williams, The Brennan Lecture: Interpreting State
Constitutions as Unique Legal Documents, 27 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 189 (2002).
21
See Clint Bolick, State Constitutions: Freedom’s Frontier, CATO POL’Y REP., Nov./Dec. 2016, at 9,
10–11.
22
See Helen Hershkoff, State Constitutions: A National Perspective, 3 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 7, 12–13,
19–20 (1993).
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“Unholy Trinity” of assumption of risk, the fellow-servant rule, and
contributory negligence—meant that the employee would often lose.23
Dissatisfaction with this state of events led judges to moderate or abolish
some of the employer-friendly tort doctrines. Legislatures started to do the
same. Some employers, seeing the writing on the wall, tried to implement
insurance-like compensation schemes as a substitute for tort liability, but this
involved prospective liability waivers, which courts generally held to be
unenforceable.
The grand legislative compromise was workers’ compensation: now,
employers paid into a fund, and employees were compensated without regard
to fault, usually by a state administrative agency.24
It’s true that workers “paid” for their workers’ comp benefits in the form of
lower salaries.25 But they also benefited by having access to a cheap form of
insurance that didn’t require them to litigate their employers’ negligence.
Today, workers’ comp benefits are often lower than what a victorious tort
plaintiff could get at trial (before subtracting attorneys’ fees)—but these
benefits (since they don’t rely on negligence) are also much more certain than
tort recoveries.
Employers had to pay into the workers’ comp system, but, as noted above,
they passed on most of these costs to their workers; and they also “bought”
labor peace and reduced their liability risk.

23
On the history of workers’ comp discussed in this and the following paragraphs, see generally Evelyn
Atkinson, Out of the Household: Master-Servant Relations and Employer Liability Law, 25 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 205 (2013); Epstein, supra note 7; Fishback & Kantor, Did Workers Pay, supra note 7; Fishback &
Kantor, Adoption of Workers’ Comp, supra note 7.
24
In Alabama, though, the agency doesn’t resolve workers’ compensation benefit disputes. The agency
gives nonbinding recommendations; disputes are handled by the judiciary. See ALA. CODE § 25-5-88 (2016);
Steven W. Ford & James A. Abernathy II, Historical Development of Alabama’s Workers’ Compensation
Law: Remedies Existing Prior to Workers’ Compensation Legislation, 61 ALA. LAW. 48, 51 (2000);
Frequently Asked Questions, ALA. DEP’T LAB., https://labor.alabama.gov/wc/faq.aspx (last visited Mar. 7,
2018).
25
See, e.g., Fishback & Kantor, Did Workers Pay, supra note 7, 724–36; Fishback & Kantor, Adoption
of Workers’ Comp, supra note 7, 309–10; cf. Jonathan Gruber & Alan B. Krueger, The Incidence of Mandated
Employer-Provided Insurance: Lessons from Workers’ Compensation Insurance, 5 TAX POL’Y & ECON. 111,
139 (1991) (similarly finding cost-shifting to workers using modern data); Michael J. Moore & W. Kip
Viscusi, Promoting Safety Through Workers’ Compensation: The Efficacy and Net Wage Costs of Injury
Insurance, 20 RAND J. ECON. 499, 501, 510, 512 (1989) (same); W. Kip Viscusi & Michael J. Moore,
Workers’ Compensation: Wage Effects, Benefit Inadequacies, and the Value of Health Losses, 69 REV. ECON.
& STAT. 249, 259–60 (1987) (same).
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In the end, everyone got something, which is why there is no broad
movement today to abolish the system.26 At the time, concerns about
constitutionality led many states to adopt “voluntary” workers’ comp laws, in
which employers could elect between workers’ comp coverage and traditional
tort liability (although without the traditional employer defenses).27 But
modern-day workers’ comp laws are generally compulsory, and these laws are
now universally recognized as constitutional.28
The proposed administrative med-mal compensation systems are basically
similar to workers’ comp in many states. They abolish common-law
negligence tort actions and replace them with an agency-based, juryless
administrative compensation procedure where the standard of liability is
different than traditional negligence.29 Workers’ comp is constitutional
everywhere, suggesting that these compensation systems are probably also
constitutional.30
* * *

26
See Michael C. Duff, Worse Than Pirates or Prussian Chancellors: A State’s Authority to Opt-Out of
the Quid Pro Quo, 17 MARQ. BENEFITS & SOC. WELFARE L. REV. 123, 123 (2016) (calling workers’ comp “the
quid pro quo/Grand Bargain of the early twentieth century”). But cf., e.g., Robert H. Ashford & William G.
Johnson, Negligence vs. No-Fault Liability: An Analysis of the Workers’ Compensation Example, 12 SETON
HALL L. REV. 725, 766 (1982) (“[D]espite approximately three-quarters of a century of public concern and
controversy, one cannot conclude, on the basis of data generally cited to demonstrate the superiority of
workers’ compensation over negligence, that workers’ compensation has effected an improvement in terms of
the wage loss compensation and deterrence objectives over the evolving negligence system it replaced.”);
Duff, supra, at 134 (discussing erosion in several states); id. at 149–50 (discussing erosion in Florida); id. at
184–85; Paul C. Weiler, Workers’ Compensation and Product Liability: The Interaction of a Tort and a NonTort Regime, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 825, 829 (1989) (discussing erosion of workers’ comp benefits).
27
See, e.g., Ives v. S. Buffalo Ry., 94 N.E. 431 (N.Y. 1911) (striking down compulsory workers’ comp
law); see also Duff, supra note 26, at 136–37 (noting that Texas has always had a voluntary workers’ comp
law, although all other states have switched to compulsory systems); id. at 141 (noting that Oklahoma has
recently allowed employers to opt out of workers’ comp).
28
See, e.g., N.Y. Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 208 (1917). Not that all tort litigation is precluded:
an employee injured on the job by a defective product, for instance, can still sue the product manufacturer. See,
e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, The Interaction Between Product Liability and Workers’ Compensation as Ex Post
Remedies for Workplace Injuries, 5 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 185, 186–87 (1989); Weiler, supra note 26, at 825,
834–38.
29
See infra text accompanying notes 66–68.
30
But one shouldn’t push the workers’ comp analogy too far: in Alabama, workers’ comp has been
upheld on the theory that it’s a voluntary substitute for common-law tort actions. See, e.g., Grantham v. Denke,
359 So. 2d 785 (Ala. 1978); Pipkin v. S. Elec. & Pipefitting Co., 358 So. 2d 1015 (Ala. 1978). The voluntary
aspect of workers’ comp may no longer be true, see Reed v. Brunson, 527 So. 2d 102, 121–22 (Ala. 1988)
(Jones, J., concurring in the result), but the Supreme Court of Alabama has apparently never abandoned this
rationale.
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This Article focuses on the law of Georgia, Florida, and Alabama, three
states where med-mal compensation systems have been proposed. Part I
summarizes such systems. The following Parts analyze how challenges to these
systems would fare under jury trial clauses (Part II), access-to-courts/right-to-a
remedy clauses (Part III), and due process/equal protection clauses (Part IV).31
I.

MED-MAL REFORM: PAST AND FUTURE

A. The Movements for Tort Reform and Med-Mal Reform
The tort reform and med-mal reform movements have been ably
summarized and discussed elsewhere,32 so I’ll just note some of the most
important features. Much of the impetus for the med-mal reform movement
has stemmed from rising med-mal liability premiums, which were blamed on
an out-of-control liability system that produced “outrageously large damages
awards” for “sympathetic plaintiffs who brought frivolous claims.”33 Some
reformers advocated, and various states passed, a number of measures,
including:
•
•
•
•

capping noneconomic damages;34
capping or otherwise limiting punitive damages;35
increasing courts’ ability to dismiss, or increasing sanctions for,
frivolous claims;36
limiting joint and several liability (i.e., providing that joint
tortfeasors are liable only in proportion to the degree of their
fault);37

31
State cases discussing tort reform provisions have occasionally relied on other clauses—for instance,
the takings clause, separation of powers, single-subject provisions, or rules against special legislation—but
these provisions are litigated more rarely, and usually don’t implicate the essence of the administrative
provision. See, e.g., Bryan et al., supra note 12, at 155; David F. Maron, Statutory Damage Caps: Analysis of
the Scope of Right to Jury Trial and the Constitutionality of Mississippi Statutory Caps on Noneconomic
Damages, 32 MISS. C. L. REV. 109, 120–23 (2013); Jones, supra note 12, at 101–02.
32
See, e.g., HUBER, supra note 5; OLSON, supra note 5; Hubbard, supra note 1; Zeiler, supra note 2.
33
Zeiler, supra note 2, at 679 (first citing Eric Torbenson & Jason Roberson, Tort Reform: Is This
Change Healthy?, DALL. MORNING NEWS, June 17, 2007, at 1A; then citing Tim Parris, Texas Urgently Needs
Tort Reform to Avert Further Damage to Healthcare System, TEXANS FOR LAWSUIT REFORM (Nov. 1, 2002),
https://www.tortreform.com/content/texas-urgently-needs-tort-reform-avert-further-damage-health-caresystem; and then citing Mike Thomas, Op-Ed., Medical Malpractice Needs an Overhaul, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
Sept. 6, 2009, at B1); see also Hubbard, supra note 1, at 517–18.
34
Hubbard, supra note 1, at 492–99; Zeiler, supra note 2, at 679; see also id. at 684–85, 684 nn.56–69
(citing competing empirical studies on the effect of damages caps).
35
Hubbard, supra note 1, at 499–509.
36
Id. at 510–11.
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shortening statutes of limitations or statutes of repose;38
abolishing the collateral source rule (i.e., allowing plaintiffs’
recoveries to be diminished by any amount recovered from other
sources, like insurance payments);39
limiting attorneys’ contingency fees;40
providing for periodic payments of future damages;41 and
implementing pretrial screening panels.42

B. The State Con Law Rebuff
In the Introduction, I gave a few examples of cases in which state supreme
courts struck down past tort reform efforts. Here is a slightly more complete
picture, which goes beyond the three states that are the subject of this Article.
The most commonly known types of med-mal reform provisions are
damages caps; these have often been struck down on various constitutional
theories.
For example, the Georgia Tort Reform Act of 2005 implemented several
changes to the tort system. It provided for fee-shifting in certain circumstances
against parties who rejected settlement offers43 and against parties who
presented frivolous claims or defenses;44 it replaced joint and several liability
with apportionment of fault among co-defendants;45 it limited liability for
certain providers of emergency medical care;46 and it made various other
changes. One of the most important provisions of the Act was a cap on
noneconomic damages:

37
Id. at 488–92; Zeiler, supra note 2, at 682; see also id. at 683 & nn.47–48 (citing competing sources,
some suggesting “that joint and several liability limitations are associated with lower premiums,” and others
suggesting “that these limitations do not decrease payouts”).
38
Zeiler, supra note 2, at 682; see also id. at 683–84, 683 nn.49–54 (citing competing sources
suggesting that such reforms either do or don’t reduce average payouts, claim frequency, or premiums).
Statutes of limitations and statutes of repose aren’t the same thing. See infra text accompanying notes 283,
301–03.
39
Hubbard, supra note 1, at 485–88; Zeiler, supra note 2, at 682.
40
Hubbard, supra note 1, at 511–13; Zeiler, supra note 2, at 684.
41
Hubbard, supra note 1, at 518; Zeiler, supra note 2, at 684.
42
Hubbard, supra note 1, at 521–23; Zeiler, supra note 2, at 684; see also id. at 684 & n.55 (stating that
“[t]he literature . . . signal[s] consensus” on the ineffectiveness of “attorney contingency fee limits, collateral
source offsets, pretrial screening panels, and periodic payments” on “claim frequency, payment severity, or
premiums”).
43
GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-68(b) (West Supp. 2017).
44
Id. § 9-11-68(e).
45
Id. § 51-12-31.
46
Id. § 51-1-29.5(c).
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In any verdict returned or judgment entered in a medical
malpractice action, including an action for wrongful death, against
one or more health care providers, the total amount recoverable by a
claimant for noneconomic damages in such action shall be limited to
an amount not to exceed $350,000.00, regardless of the number of
defendant health care providers against whom the claim is asserted or
the number of separate causes of action on which the claim is
based.47

The Supreme Court of Georgia held that this provision violated the
Georgia Constitution’s jury trial provision, under which “[t]he right to trial by
jury shall remain inviolate.”48 This provision had been held to preserve jury
trial rights as they existed in the late eighteenth century; the court had no
trouble finding that med-mal cases—including claims for noneconomic
damages—were litigated to juries under eighteenth-century English and early
American law, and that the Tort Reform Act, “[b]y requiring the court to
reduce a noneconomic damages award determined by a jury that exceeds the
statutory limit, . . . clearly nullifies the jury’s findings of fact regarding
damages and thereby undermines the jury’s basic function.”49
The Florida Supreme Court also struck down a per-incident cap on
noneconomic damages in wrongful death cases arising from med-mal—but on
a state equal protection theory,50 not a jury trial theory. The Supreme Court of
Alabama likewise struck down a cap on noneconomic damages (including
punitive damages) on a state equal protection theory51 (among other
grounds)—oddly, since Alabama actually lacks equal protection language in its
constitution.52
Other med-mal reform provisions—aside from damages caps—have also
been held unconstitutional in various states. Consider, for instance, statutes of
limitations or statutes of repose. An Arizona statute provided “that a ‘cause of
action for medical malpractice against a licensed health care provider accrues
as of the date of the injury . . .’ and, with certain exceptions[,] is barred three

47

Id. § 51-13-1(b).
Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d 218, 221 (Ga. 2010) (alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting GA. CONST. of 1983, art. I, § 1, para. XI(a)).
49
Id. at 221–23 (citing Lakin v. Senco Prods., Inc., 987 P.2d 463, 473 (Or. 1999)); see also infra text
accompanying notes 146–48.
50
See Estate of McCall v. United States, 134 So. 3d 894, 901 (Fla. 2014) (plurality opinion); id. at 919–
20 (Pariente, J., concurring in result); see also infra text accompanying note 372.
51
See Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass’n, 592 So. 2d 156 (Ala. 1991) (plurality opinion).
52
See infra Section IV.D.
48
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years thereafter.”53 The statute was challenged on an equal protection theory.54
The Arizona Supreme Court held that, in light of the state constitutional
guarantee that “[t]he right of action to recover damages for injuries shall never
be abrogated,”55 the statute of limitations burdened a fundamental right.56
Accordingly, it applied strict scrutiny and struck down the statute.57
Arizona’s approach is probably stronger than most other states’. But
Alabama also has an access-to-courts provision,58 and the Supreme Court of
Alabama has also struck down statute-of-limitations provisions on these sorts
of grounds.59
Another sort of provision is a prohibition on filing a med-mal claim in
court before it has been submitted to, and ruled on, by some sort of screening
panel—a medical review commission or arbitration panel. The supreme courts
of New Mexico and Missouri have struck down such statutes under an accessto-courts constitutional provision,60 and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
has struck down such a statute under a jury trial provision.61
C. What Do Patient Compensation Systems Look Like?
So much for past med-mal reform efforts—the few cases discussed in the
last section were merely a small sample. Administrative patient compensation
schemes are an effort to craft an alternative regime that—although it works a
much more radical change to the med-mal compensation system as we know
it—may be at the same time more likely to withstand constitutional attack.
In this section, I use Georgia’s S.B. 141 to illustrate what patient
compensation systems look like, although other state bills are broadly similar.
Knowing the structure of these bills is important for understanding what state

53
Kenyon v. Hammer, 688 P.2d 961, 964 (Ariz. 1984) (en banc) (citations omitted) (quoting ARIZ.
REV. STAT. § 12-564(A) (repealed 1985)).
54
Id. at 969.
55
ARIZ. CONST. art. XVIII, § 6.
56
See Kenyon, 688 P.2d at 970–75.
57
See id. at 975–79.
58
ALA. CONST. art. I, § 13; see infra Section III.B.
59
See Lankford v. Sullivan, Long & Hagerty, 416 So. 2d 996 (Ala. 1982); infra text accompanying
notes 275–83; see also Peter Zablotsky, From a Whimper to a Bang: The Trend Toward Finding Occurrence
Based Statutes of Limitations Governing Negligent Misdiagnosis of Diseases with Long Latency Periods
Unconstitutional, 103 DICK. L. REV. 455 (1999).
60
See State ex rel. Cardinal Glennon Mem’l Hosp. for Children v. Gaertner, 583 S.W.2d 107 (Mo.
1979) (en banc); Jiron v. Mahlab, 659 P.2d 311 (N.M. 1983).
61
See Mattos v. Thompson, 421 A.2d 190 (Pa. 1980).
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constitutional provisions will feature most prominently in plaintiffs’ potential
challenges.
In the first place, S.B. 141 preempts any common-law or other rights by
injured parties62 against medical providers “directly involved in providing the
medical treatment from which such injury or death occurred, arising out of or
related to a medical negligence claim.”63 This is the fundamental feature of the
scheme—which gives rise to constitutional claims related to access to courts or
the right to a remedy.64
Next, S.B. 141 creates a Patient Compensation System, to be administered
by a Patient Compensation Board.65 The bill defines a “medical injury” (in the
case of an individual provider) as “a personal injury or wrongful death due to
medical treatment, including a missed diagnosis, which would have been
avoided . . . under the care of an experienced specialist provider practicing in
the same field of care under the same or similar circumstances.”66
So the key is that an injury is not a “medical injury” (and is therefore not
compensable through the system)67 unless it was avoidable. It need not have
been negligent, but it must have been avoidable68: after all, nature is already
trying to kill you when you come into the doctor’s office, so a completely nofault system might be infeasible.
62
Or their representatives and families. S. 141, 152d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 51-13-3(c) (Ga. 2013).
Proposed section 51-13-3(c) only purports to make the administrative system exclusive for applicants, defined
as people who file an application under this chapter, id. § 51-13-2(1). But, “[i]n order to obtain compensation
for a medical injury, a person . . . shall file an application with the Patient Compensation System,” id. § 51-135(a), so in effect the administrative system is exclusive for all victims of med-mal. See also H.R. 739, 2014
Leg., Reg. Sess. § 766.405(1) (Fla. 2014).
63
Ga. S. 141 § 51-13-3(c); see also Fla. H.R. 739 § 766.403(3).
64
See infra Part III.
65
The details of the administrative agency are described at length in S.B. 141 section 51-13-4. See also
S. 413, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 4 (Ala. 2016); Fla. H.R. 739 § 766.404.
66
Ga. S. 141 § 51-13-2(9)(A)(i). The same section goes on to specify that, in the case of a general
practitioner provider, “medical injury” is an injury that would have been avoided “under the care of . . . an
experienced general practitioner provider practicing under the same circumstances.” Id. And, in the case of
“care provided by a provider in a system of care,” a “medical injury” is defined as an injury that would have
been avoided “if rendered within an optimal system of care under the same or similar circumstances.” Id. § 5113-1(9)(A)(ii); see also Fla. H.R. 739 § 766.402(9)(a).
67
See Ga. S. 141 § 51-13-6(a)(2) (“If the Office of Medical Review determines that the application
does not, prima facie, constitute a medical injury, the office shall send a rejection letter . . . .”); see also Ala. S.
413 § 6(a)(3); Fla. H.R. 739 § 766.406(1)(b).
68
See Fla. H.R. 739 § 766.403(2)(c); Ga. S. 141 § 51-13-3(b)(2) (“The General Assembly intends that
the definition of ‘medical injury’ encompass a broader range of personal injuries as compared to a negligence
standard, such that a greater number of applications qualify for compensation under this chapter as compared
to claims filed under a negligence standard.”). Alabama’s S.B. 413 contains a “proximate cause” requirement
rather than an “avoidability” requirement. Ala. S. 413 § 3(9)(c).
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Moreover, the concept of avoidability is limited:
A medical injury shall only include consideration of an alternate
course of treatment if the harm could have been avoided through a
different but equally effective manner with respect to the treatment of
the underlying condition. In addition, a medical injury shall only
include consideration of information that would have been known to
an experienced specialist or readily available to an optimal system of
care at the time of the medical treatment.69

Applications are reviewed by an Office of Medical Review and (under
some circumstances) by an independent medical review panel.70 There are no
juries involved; this is what gives rise to constitutional claims related to the
jury trial right.71 Payments are made pursuant to a compensation schedule,
which is initially determined based on average medical malpractice costs for
the previous year, and afterwards is increased based on inflation.72 Payments
are also reduced to the extent the patient has gotten payments from collateral
sources, including insurance.73 Doctors pay contributions into the Patient
Compensation System Trust Fund, which is used to fund payouts according to
the compensation schedule.74
Challenges under due process or equal protection theories75 may stem from
any aspect of such a statute, since any government action violates due process
or equal protection if it is irrational.
The following Parts discuss the constitutional barriers to statutes like this
one and explain why these statutes will likely survive constitutional challenges.
II. THE JURY TRIAL RIGHT
As I’ve explained above,76 constitutional civil jury trial provisions have
been a frequent stumbling block for tort reform proposals. But not all jury trial

69
Ga. S. 141 § 51-13-2(9)(B): see also Fla. H.R. 739 § 766.402(9)(b). “Medical injury” is defined to
exclude injuries caused by product defects in drugs or devices. Ga. S. 141 § 51-13-2(9)(C).
70
See Ala. S. 413 § 6(b)–(c); Fla. H.R. 739 § 766.406; Ga. S. 141 § 51-13-6.
71
See infra Part II.
72
See Fla. H.R. 739 § 766.404(4)(f)(2)(a); Ga. S. 141 § 51-13-4(d)(5)(B)(i).
73
See Ala. S. 413 §§ 3(4), 6(f); Fla. H.R. 739 §§ 766.402(4), .406(5); Ga. S. 141 §§ 51-13-2(4), -6(e).
74
See Fla. H.R. 739 § 766.408(1), (5); Ga. S. 141 §§ 51-13-8, -10. Alabama’s S.B. 413 provides that
contribution amounts should be based on anticipated payouts, see Ala. S. 413 § 8(a), but also provides, more
restrictively, that the amounts collected can’t exceed certain listed amounts, see id. § 8(b), and that the
amounts paid out can’t exceed the amounts collected, see id. §§ 4(d)(6)(b), 8(e).
75
See infra Part IV.
76
See supra Section I.B.
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provisions are created (or have been interpreted) equally. This Part describes
the civil jury trial right in the federal, Florida, Alabama, and Georgia
constitutions, and how they differ.77
Many American constitutions contain a civil jury trial right.78 The Federal
Constitution’s Seventh Amendment right doesn’t apply to the states,79 so one
wouldn’t use it in challenging state patient compensation systems. But it’s still
useful to compare Seventh Amendment doctrine with similar-looking state
civil jury trial rights.
All four of the jury trial provisions (federal, Florida, Alabama, and
Georgia) discussed here are preservationist in the sense that their goal is to
preserve the jury trial right as it existed in some reference year (for instance,
1791). Looking in-depth at jury trial case law shows us that jury trial rights can
differ on a number of dimensions.
Let’s consider four specific questions, as applied to a type of case that
would have been litigated in court, with a jury trial, if it had arisen in the
reference year:
(1) Can the legislature do away with juries in a common-law case, if
the case continues to be litigated in court? Generally, the answer
is no.
(2) Can the legislature abolish the cause of action entirely? Generally,
the answer is yes (although other provisions, like access-tocourts/right-to-a-remedy clauses, may impose stricter limitations
in places where they exist).80
(3) Can the legislature cap damages for cases that are litigated in
court? The answer is yes under the Federal Constitution, but no
under the Florida, Alabama, and Georgia jury trial rights.81
77

See Maron, supra note 31, at 112–19 (discussing Mississippi jury trial right).
See, e.g., Bryan et al., supra note 12, at 154–56; Jones, supra note 12, at 97–100.
79
See Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 169 n.4 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Hardware Dealers
Mut. Fire Ins. v. Glidden Co., 284 U.S. 151, 158 (1931); Wagner Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Lyndon, 262 U.S. 226, 232
(1923); N.Y. Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 208 (1917); Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. v. Bombolis, 241
U.S. 211, 217–19 (1916); see also Randy J. Holland, State Constitutions: Purpose and Function, 69 TEMP. L.
REV. 989, 1003 (1996) (“[T]he right to a jury trial in [state] civil proceedings has always been and remains
exclusively protected by provisions in the state constitutions.” (first citing McCool v. Gehret, 657 A.2d 269,
281 (Del. 1995); then citing Richard S. Arnold, Trial by Jury: The Constitutional Right to a Jury of Twelve in
Civil Trials, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (1993))).
80
See infra Part III.
81
For an argument that Federal Sixth Amendment principles relevant to criminal sentencing be used to
inform the permissibility of civil liability caps in states with constitutional civil jury trial rights, see Shaakirrah
R. Sanders, Deconstructing Juryless Fact-Finding in Civil Cases, 25 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 235 (2016).
78
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(4) Can the legislature withdraw a cause of action from the courts
entirely and commit it to an administrative agency?
Only question (4) is relevant here. Perhaps surprisingly—given that all
three states discussed here say no for question (3)—the answer is yes. In the
federal and Florida systems, courts have said that the administrative tribunal
must answer a legal question sufficiently different from the traditional
common-law question. But this isn’t a significant limitation for patient
compensation systems, which are not negligence-based.
A. The Federal Seventh Amendment Right
The Seventh Amendment’s civil jury trial guarantee provides that “[i]n
Suits at common law . . . , the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.”82 This
is, by its terms, a preservationist provision, which looks to the practices of the
English courts in 1791, when the Bill of Rights was ratified. If a particular sort
of claim would have been heard at law in 1791, the jury right applies, while if
it would have been heard in equity, the jury right doesn’t.83 In practice, the
distinction tends to come down to an analysis of the remedy sought: damages
cases are legal, while injunction or specific performance cases are equitable.84
The Supreme Court has thus held that the Seventh Amendment demands a
jury trial even for newly created statutory actions—such as under Title VIII of
the Civil Rights Act,85 § 1983,86 or for statutory damages under the Copyright
Act87—where the relief provided is tort-like damages, a sort of relief
traditionally provided by law courts. On the other hand, back pay under Title
VII is an equitable remedy, so the jury trial right doesn’t apply to those sorts of
cases.88

82

U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
See, e.g., Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 374–75 (1974); Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474,
490–91 (1935) (Stone, J., dissenting).
84
See Martin H. Redish & Daniel J. La Fave, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial in Non-Article III
Proceedings: A Study in Dysfunctional Constitutional Theory, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 407, 413–14
(1995); Suja A. Thomas, A Limitation on Congress: “In Suits at Common Law,” 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 1071
(2010).
85
See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
86
See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707–11 (1999) (plurality
opinion).
87
See Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 347–55 (1998).
88
Curtis, 415 U.S. at 196–97.
83
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Medical malpractice clearly falls on the “law” side, because med-mal suits
always seek damages, and such suits were tried at common law in 1791.89
However, the abolition of causes of action probably doesn’t raise any Seventh
Amendment issues,90 nor do damages caps.91
The Seventh Amendment may erect some bar to removing cases from
courts and giving them to administrative agencies or specialized courts, when
doing so results in eliminating the jury.92
It’s true that in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,93 the Supreme
Court held “that the Seventh Amendment is generally inapplicable in
administrative proceedings, where jury trials would be incompatible with the
whole concept of administrative adjudication and would substantially interfere
with the NLRB’s role in the statutory scheme.”94 This was reaffirmed in Atlas
Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission.95
But this doesn’t mean administrative (juryless) adjudication is generally
permissible: when true private rights are involved, the Seventh Amendment
prevents Congress from depriving parties of their right to a jury trial.96
Congress has more leeway when it “creates new statutory ‘public rights’”—
meaning rights “where the Government is involved in its sovereign capacity
under an otherwise valid statute creating enforceable public rights”97 (or at
least rights that are “closely integrated into a public regulatory scheme”).98
Congress may assign public-rights cases to juryless agencies or specialized
courts, even if those rights are “closely analogous to common-law claims.”99
In other words, for the juryless administrative forum to be consistent with
the Seventh Amendment, the right being litigated there must be sufficiently
89
See 8 JOHN WENTWORTH, A COMPLETE SYSTEM OF PLEADING 416–17 (London, Bunney, Thomson &
Co. 1798) (documenting a 1777 action for negligence by a male midwife); 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *122 & n.w–a; J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 415–16, 416
n.78 (4th ed. 2002).
90
See, e.g., Boyd v. Bulala, 877 F.2d 1191, 1196 (4th Cir. 1989).
91
See, e.g., Hemmings v. Tidyman’s Inc., 285 F.3d 1174, 1202 (9th Cir. 2002); Davis v. Omitowoju,
883 F.2d 1155, 1159–65 (3d Cir. 1989); Boyd, 877 F.2d at 1196.
92
See, e.g., Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 51–52 (1989); Atlas Roofing Co. v.
Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 455 (1977).
93
301 U.S. 1 (1937).
94
Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194 (1974) (footnote omitted) (so characterizing Jones & Laughlin).
95
430 U.S. 442 (1977).
96
See Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 51–55.
97
Atlas Roofing, 430 U.S. at 455, 458.
98
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 593–94 (1985).
99
Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 52.
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different from the common-law right that it displaced. But even a small degree
of difference might be sufficient to insulate the scheme from attack.
B. The Florida Jury Trial Right
Under the Florida Constitution, “[t]he right of trial by jury shall be secure
to all and remain inviolate.”100 This preserves the jury trial right as of 1845,
when Florida was admitted to the Union.101
The outright abolition of a cause of action doesn’t raise any problems
under the jury trial right.102 In Lasky v. State Farm Insurance, the Florida
Supreme Court upheld the Florida no-fault auto insurance scheme against a
jury trial challenge.103 The court denied that the abrogation of a tort action
could ever violate the jury trial right:
Does the abrogation of an existing cause of action, triable by
jury, violate the right to jury trial? If such is the case, the Legislature
would lose a great deal of flexibility, for it could not enact laws such
as workmen’s compensation acts, which abrogate a preexisting right
to jury trial. As was stated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Mountain
Timber Co. v. Washington, with respect to the Washington
workmen’s compensation law:
“[W]e find nothing in the act that excludes a trial by jury. As
between employee and employer, the act abolishes all right of
recovery in ordinary cases, and therefore leaves nothing to be tried
by jury.”
Similarly here, the no-fault act abolishes all right of recovery of
specific items of damage in specific circumstances, and, as to those
areas, leaves nothing to be tried by a jury. See also, [a New
Hampshire opinion], reaching a similar result as to New Hampshire’s
no-fault insurance act, and our own previous decisions upholding the
validity of our workmen’s compensation act. While the abolition of a
cause of action triable by jury might in some instance be

100

FLA. CONST. art. I, § 22.
See Estate of McCall v. United States, 134 So. 3d 894, 915 (Fla. 2014) (plurality opinion) (citing
Forfeiture of 1978 Chevrolet Van, 493 So. 2d 433, 434 (Fla. 1986)); Dep’t of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v.
Bonanno, 568 So. 2d 24, 28 (Fla. 1990) (quoting Forfeiture of 1978 Chevrolet Van, 493 So. 2d at 435).
102
But it may raise problems under the access-to-courts right, as discussed below, see infra Section
III.A.
103
296 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974).
101
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unconstitutional on another ground,104 the present statutory
provisions do not violate the right to trial by jury.105

What about when an action isn’t just abolished but is also shifted to an
administrative agency? Lasky itself explicitly mentions workers’ comp statutes
(and mentions Florida’s “own previous decisions upholding the validity” of the
statute),106 so under this dictum in Lasky, the shifting of on-the-job injury
litigation from courts to workers’ comp tribunals must have been valid.
Later case law requires us to be more careful about this conclusion, but it
seems that the conclusion still holds up. In Broward County v. La Rosa, a
county ordinance created a human rights board that was empowered “to award
actual damages, including compensation for humiliation and embarrassment, to
victims of race discrimination.”107 The Florida Supreme Court held that this
violated the jury trial right because “[c]ommon law undeniably recognized
actions for unliquidated damage awards. When a tribunal with the power to
make such awards for humiliation and embarrassment tries an accused, that
accused has an inalienable right to a jury trial.”108
So if, rather than altering the legal standard, a workers’ comp statute took
traditional negligence litigation against employers for on-the-job injuries out of
courts and placed them into agencies, this would seem to be invalid under
Broward County. But administrative actions on statutes unknown to the
common law—that is, based on some legal standard other than negligence—
don’t violate the jury trial right.109 So apparently, what saves workers’ comp
tribunals from invalidity under the jury trial right is that what’s being handled
in these tribunals is not the traditional negligence action, but rather a
different—no-fault—action unknown to the common law.

104
Here, the court cited in a footnote Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973), involving a challenge
under the access-to-courts right. See infra Section III.A (discussing Kluger).
105
Lasky, 296 So. 2d at 22 (citations and footnotes omitted) (first quoting Mountain Timber Co. v.
Washington, 243 U.S. 219, 235 (1917); then citing Op. of Justices, 304 A.2d 881 (N.H. 1973)).
106
But Lasky didn’t cite any of these supposed decisions, and I have been unable to find pre-Lasky
decisions opining on the validity of the workers’ comp statute under the jury trial right.
107
505 So. 2d 422, 422–23 (Fla. 1987).
108
Id. at 424; see also Metro. Dade Cty. Fair Hous. & Emp’t App. Bd. v. Sunrise Vill. Mobile Home
Park, Inc., 511 So. 2d 962, 965–66 (Fla. 1987).
109
See Dep’t of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v. Bonanno, 568 So. 2d 24, 28 (Fla. 1990) (inverse
condemnation proceedings arising from destruction of citrus plants); Golden Dolphin No. 2, Inc. v. State, 403
So. 2d 1372, 1374 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (beverage license suspension); Robins v. Fla. Real Estate
Comm’n, 162 So. 2d 535, 537–38 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (real estate commission proceedings against a real
estate broker accused of fraud); Fla. Indus. Comm’n v. Mason, 151 So. 2d 874, 876 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
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Thus, it seems that the med-mal administrative procedure is valid under the
Florida civil jury trial right because it does two valid things: (1) it abolishes the
negligence action against doctors, and (2) it establishes an agency proceeding
against doctors—not based on the traditional negligence standard, but based on
a different, non-common law, legal standard.
C. The Alabama Jury Trial Right
The Alabama jury trial right—“the right of trial by jury shall remain
inviolate”110—is likewise preservationist, and the relevant year has been held
to be 1901, the year of the current constitution.111 When the legislature has
conferred a jury trial right that did not previously exist, it can later change its
mind and restrict or abolish it without running afoul of the constitutional jury
trial guarantee.112 But where the jury trial right already existed in 1901, the
Supreme Court of Alabama has been fairly strict.
In Gilbreath v. Wallace, the question was whether a statute could provide
for a six-member jury for the trial of a will contest.113 Because will contests
were tried by juries in 1901, the statute was invalid: twelve is a magic number
under the Alabama Constitution.114
In Clark v. Container Corp. of America, the supreme court struck down a
statute directing courts to, under certain circumstances, structure awards of
future damages in periodic payments.115 The rule in 1901 was that the jury
would reduce damages to their present value, which necessarily involves a
calculation of a discount rate. The determination of the discount rate was a
question of fact for the jury. And so a statute preventing the jury from reducing
damages to present value “[took] away from the jury a factfinding function
(when a jury is the factfinder) that was within the province of the jury [in
1901].”116
But note that parenthetical phrase “when a jury is the factfinder”—does
that mean that the jury trial right poses no hurdle to statutes removing the jury
entirely? The Clark court, relatedly, and tantalizingly, wrote:

110
111

ALA. CONST. art. I, § 11.
See Gilbreath v. Wallace, 292 So. 2d 651, 653 (Ala. 1974); Alford v. State, 54 So. 213, 215–16 (Ala.

1910).
112
113
114
115
116

See Gilbreath, 292 So. 2d at 652.
Id.
See id. at 656.
589 So. 2d 184 (Ala. 1991).
Id. at 195.
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We do not mean to imply that the legislative department cannot by
another general act abolish the procedure or rule requiring that all
damages for a decrease in future earnings be reduced to present value
or even abolish all damages for loss of future earnings. That is not
before us . . . .117

The court answered the question in Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass’n,
striking down a cap on noneconomic damages (including punitive damages)
under the jury trial right.118 For the jury trial right to remain inviolate, the right
“must not diminish over time and must be protected from all assaults to its
essential guaranties.”119 And capping the verdict “automatically and
absolutely” makes the jury’s function worse than advisory.120
But, in distinguishing this case from other cases, the Moore court wrote
that, if a statute removed a cause of action from the jury entirely, there was no
violation of the jury trial right:
[I]n Reed v. Brunson,121 we upheld the constitutionality of [an act
that] entirely abrogated causes of action by a worker against
coemployees for injuries suffered as the result of the negligence or
wantonness of the coemployees. Where the legislature completely
abolishes a cause of action, “the right to trial by jury becomes
irrelevant.” In other words, the right to a trial by jury does not arise
in the absence of a cause of action requiring a finder of fact. . . .
For the same reasons, the right to a jury trial is not impaired by
[a statute] in which the legislature completely abolished a cause of
action in negligence against a guest passenger.122

There apparently haven’t been any cases since Moore contradicting this
statement.123
The court went on, after Moore, to strike down other caps.124 (Because of
this, perhaps the maximum contribution and payout amounts proposed in
117

Id. at 197 (citation omitted).
592 So. 2d 156 (Ala. 1991).
119
Id. at 164 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 771 P.2d 711, 722
(Wash. 1989) (en banc)).
120
Id.
121
527 So. 2d 102 (Ala. 1988).
122
Moore, 592 So. 2d at 165 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (first quoting Sofie, 771
P.2d at 719; then citing Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219, 235 (1927); and then citing
Pickett v. Matthews, 192 So. 261 (Ala. 1939)).
123
The court dropped a footnote: “Of course, an act abolishing a cause of action must not violate [the
access to courts right] or other provisions of the Constitution.” Id. at 165 n.5; see also infra Section III.B.
124
See, e.g., Ray v. Anesthesia Assocs. of Mobile, P.C., 674 So. 2d 525 (Ala. 1995) (striking down
another cap); Smith v. Schulte, 671 So. 2d 1334 (Ala. 1995) (striking down a cap on amounts recoverable in
118

VOLOKH GALLEYPROOFS

2018]

5/15/2018 3:19 PM

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AS WORKERS’ COMP

997

S.B. 413, the med-mal administrative compensation bill introduced in
Alabama—which function much like caps—might be vulnerable.)125 But the
court hasn’t questioned the statement in Moore that statutes removing causes
of action from the jury entirely don’t implicate the jury trial right (although
they might implicate other constitutional provisions, like the access-to-courts
right).126
D. The Georgia Jury Trial Right
Georgia, like Florida and Alabama, provides that “[t]he right to trial by
jury shall remain inviolate”127—again, a preservationist provision that has been
variously held to date back to 1777 or 1798.128
The Georgia courts have been active in using this provision to strike down
tort reforms such as damages caps that apply to ordinary cases brought in
court.129 But the provision doesn’t apply when the state adopts new
administrative procedures that are substitutes for traditional court procedures.
In Flint River Steamboat Co. v. Foster, a special statutory procedure for
steamboat employees to recover their wages was challenged as
unconstitutionally limiting the jury trial right.130 The Supreme Court of
Georgia explained:
The provision in our State Constitution, that trial by jury, as
heretofore used, shall remain inviolate, means that it shall not be
taken away, as it existed in 1798, when the instrument was adopted,

tort actions against medical providers), abrogated by Ex parte Apicella, 809 So. 2d 865 (Ala. 2001);
Henderson ex rel. Hartsfield v. Ala. Power Co., 627 So. 2d 878 (Ala. 1993) (striking down a cap on punitive
damages), abrogated by Ex parte Apicella, 809 So. 2d 865; see also Bozeman v. Busby, 639 So. 2d 501 (Ala.
1994) (striking down a statute that allowed the judge to increase a jury’s punitive award, i.e., additur). In Ex
parte Apicella, a criminal case, a plurality disapproved of Henderson and Schulte, holding that the legislature
may remove the unbridled right to punish from the jury, but this hasn’t been treated as an actual overruling of
those cases, either because Apicella is interpreted as being limited to the criminal context or because it wasn’t
a majority opinion. See, e.g., Shiv-Ram, Inc. v. McCaleb, 892 So. 2d 299 (Ala. 2003). The court has also held
that limitations on municipal liability are constitutional for reasons specifically related to avoiding strains on
the government treasury. See Garner v. Covington Cty., 624 So. 2d 1346 (Ala. 1993).
125
S. 413, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 8 (Ala. 2016).
126
See infra Section III.B.
127
GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. XI(a).
128
Compare Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d 218, 221 (Ga. 2010), Swails v.
State, 431 S.E.2d 101, 102–03 (Ga. 1993), Flint River Steamboat Co. v. Foster, 5 Ga. 194, 207–08 (1848), and
Tift v. Griffin, 5 Ga. 185, 189 (1848) (all using 1798), with Strange v. Strange, 148 S.E.2d 494, 495–96 (Ga.
1966) (using 1777).
129
See, e.g., Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d at 220.
130
5 Ga. 194 (1848).
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and not that there must be a jury in all cases. New forums may be
erected, and new remedies provided, accommodated to the ever
shifting state of society.131

The court elaborated on Foster in Crowell v. Akin.132 Crowell concerned
the validity of proceedings to register land under the land registration act.133
Because these proceedings had limited jury trials, they were likewise
challenged as violating the jury trial right. The court upheld the proceedings,
holding that the constitutional jury trial provision
is uniformly construed as not conferring a right to trial by jury in all
classes of cases, but merely as guaranteeing the continuance of the
right unchanged as it existed either at common law or by statute in
the particular state at the time of the adoption of the Constitution.
Prior to the Constitution certain classes of cases were triable without
a jury. All cases triable without a jury prior to the adoption of the
Constitution may still be so tried. It will be conceded that it is
competent for the Legislature to provide for a trial without a jury in
cases similar to those in which such a trial was in use prior to the
adoption of the Constitution. . . . In a number of cases in this state it
has been held that in civil actions the right of jury trial exists only in
those cases where the right existed prior to the first Constitution, and
that the guaranty does not apply to special proceedings not then
known or subsequently created or provided by statute . . . .134

The precise wording of Crowell, which appears in later cases, is important.
The court states that (1) “the right of jury trial exists only in those cases where
the right existed prior to the first Constitution,” and (2) “the guaranty does not
apply to special proceedings not then known or subsequently created or
provided by statute.”135
Statement (1) is a criterion of exclusion, not a criterion of inclusion: The
jury trial right exists only where it existed in the late eighteenth century, and
therefore doesn’t exist where it didn’t exist back then. But this doesn’t mean
that it necessarily exists in all cases where it did exist then. Add this to
statement (2), and you get that special, post-eighteenth century administrative

131

Id. at 207–08 (emphasis omitted).
108 S.E. 791 (Ga. 1921).
133
Id. at 792.
134
Id. at 794–95 (citations omitted).
135
Id. at 795 (emphasis added). Benton v. Georgia Marble Co., 365 S.E.2d 413, 420 (Ga. 1988), is an
example where the Supreme Court of Georgia has held that a juryless procedure is constitutional because the
procedure at issue is of statutory origin.
132
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proceedings that displace ancient jury proceedings (like med-mal cases) should
pose no problem under the jury trial right.
Neither Foster nor Crowell involved statutory arrangements that bypassed
the courts entirely and resolved cases in administrative agencies. The Supreme
Court of Georgia applied the Foster–Crowell rule to administrative tribunals in
Metropolitan Casualty Insurance v. Huhn, when the Georgia Workmen’s
Compensation Act was challenged by the employer on the grounds that it
violated the jury trial right.136
In upholding the Workmen’s Compensation Act, the court first stated that
“[u]nder the decisions of many courts,” employers “have waived this
constitutional objection by voluntarily bringing themselves within the
operation of the act.”137 (Recall that many states had voluntary acts in the early
days of workers’ comp,138 although this is no longer generally true in
Georgia.)139
But the court declined to rest its decision on the grounds of waiver. Rather,
the court held:
[T]here is no constitutional guaranty of trial by jury of the issues
arising under this act. The entire procedure involved in the act has
been brought into existence or created by the Legislature since the
adoption of our Constitution containing the provisions that the right
of trial by a jury shall remain inviolate.140

This is essentially the same as statement (2) of the Crowell language above.
Whether employees could sue their employers for unsafe workplaces in the
eighteenth century, and whether such cases were subject to trial by jury, wasn’t
discussed by the Huhn court. Rather, what was relevant was that the new
statutory procedure postdated 1798. Similarly, even though med-mal suits are
ancient, what matters with the med-mal administrative system is that the
statutory procedure, if adopted, will date from now.
The Foster–Crowell–Huhn rule continues to be valid today.141 In 1982, the
Supreme Court of Georgia upheld the validity of juryless administrative

136
137
138
139
140
141

142 S.E. 121 (Ga. 1928).
Id. at 123.
See supra text accompanying note 27.
See GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9-7 (West 2017).
Huhn, 142 S.E. at 123.
See Bell v. Cronic, 283 S.E.2d 476, 477 (Ga. 1981); Strange v. Strange, 148 S.E.2d 494 (Ga. 1966).
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proceedings to litigate overweight assessment citations for trucks.142 “There is
no constitutional right to a jury trial in these administrative proceedings,” the
court held.143 “As held in Huhn, the right of jury trial does not apply to special
proceedings not known at the time of adoption of the first Constitution, or
subsequently created or provided by statute.”144 Again, the question is whether
the special proceeding was known in 1798 or created by a later statute, not
whether the displaced proceeding was known in 1798.145
Recently, in Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, the court
struck down a statute capping noneconomic damages.146 “By requiring the
court to reduce a noneconomic damages award determined by a jury that
exceeds the statutory limit,” the court wrote, the statute “clearly nullifies the
jury’s findings of fact regarding damages and thereby undermines the jury’s
basic function.”147 This was true because there was a jury trial, the jury found
an amount of noneconomic damages exceeding the cap, and the statute would
have required the trial judge to override the jury’s determination.148
Nestlehutt poses no barrier to a med-mal administrative system because it
actually restates the Crowell–Foster–Huhn rule approving of giving cases to
administrative agencies. Relying (at a few removes) on the statement of the
rule in Foster,149 the court stated that the jury trial right “guarantees the right
to a jury trial only with respect to cases as to which there existed a right to
jury trial at common law or by statute at the time of the adoption of the
Georgia Constitution in 1798.”150
This “only” language expresses the same idea as statement (1) of the
Crowell language.151 If no jury trial right existed for a type of claim in 1798,
142

Dep’t of Transp. v. Del-Cook Timber Co., 285 S.E.2d 913, 919 (Ga. 1982).
Id.
144
Id.
145
See also Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d 218, 221 (Ga. 2010); Kelley v.
Ga. Dep’t of Human Res., 498 S.E.2d 741, 743 (Ga. 1998); Hill v. Levenson, 383 S.E.2d 110, 111 (Ga. 1989)
(requiring trial by jury in dispossessory actions, citing the rule of Del-Cook Timber and Huhn). Appellate
courts have also cited the rule recently. See Reheis v. Baxley Creosoting & Osmose Wood Preserving Co., 601
S.E.2d 781, 786–87 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004).
146
Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d at 220.
147
Id. at 223 (citing Lakin v. Senco Prods., Inc., 987 P.2d 463, 473 (Or. 1999), overruled by Horton v.
Or. Health & Sci. Univ., 376 P.3d 998 (Or. 2016)).
148
See id. at 220.
149
Nestlehutt cites Benton v. Georgia Marble Co., 365 S.E.2d 413, 420 (Ga. 1988), which cites Williams
v. Overstreet, 195 S.E.2d 906, 909 (Ga. 1973), which cites Foster.
150
691 S.E.2d at 221 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Benton, 365 S.E.2d
at 420).
151
See supra text accompanying notes 132–34.
143
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juryless trials for the same type of claim are constitutional today. The
Nestlehutt court didn’t claim the converse—that the jury trial right guarantees
the right to a jury trial for all cases as to which there did exist a right to jury
trial in 1798.152
The med-mal administrative compensation system would be an exercise of
the legislature’s “authority to modify or abrogate the common law” and
“define, limit, and modify available remedies.”153 Once the previously existing
common-law remedies are replaced by an administrative scheme, there is no
longer a jury finding to displace; there can thus be no nullification of a jury’s
determination, as there could have been in Nestlehutt.
When the first med-mal administrative compensation bill was introduced in
Georgia as S.B. 141, former Georgia Attorney General Michael Bowers
misread Nestlehutt to mean that the test is whether the displaced right existed
in 1798.154 Under this view, a juryless scheme for medical malpractice would
be invalid because injured patients had the right to a jury trial for med-mal
claims in 1798—but the similar scheme for workers’ comp claims is
constitutional because “workers injured on the job had no right at common law
to a jury trial for claims against their employer at the time.”155
This is incorrect for two reasons: First, as a historical matter, it is doubtful
that workers really had no right at common law to a jury trial against their
employers.156 (Bowers’s historical point is crucial: without it, his theory would
be unable to distinguish between med-mal and workers’ comp claims, and
152
See Benton, 365 S.E.2d at 420 (“[T]he Georgia Constitution . . . guarantees the right to a jury trial
only with respect to cases as to which there existed a right to jury trial at common law or by statute at the time
of the adoption of the Georgia Constitution in 1798.” (emphasis added) (citing Williams, 195 S.E.2d 906));
Williams, 195 S.E.2d at 909 (quoting Foster to the effect that the trial by jury right “shall not be taken away in
cases where it existed when that instrument was adopted in 1798”).
153
Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d at 223–24; see also Teasley v. Mathis, 255 S.E.2d 57, 58 (Ga. 1979) (“The
legislature . . . may modify or abrogate common law rights of action . . . .”); Ga. Lions Eye Bank, Inc. v.
Lavant, 335 S.E.2d 127, 128 (Ga. 1985) (similar).
154
Letter from Michael J. Bowers, Partner, Balch & Bingham LLP, to Donald J. Palmisano, Jr., Exec.
Dir./CEO, Med. Ass’n of Ga. 2 (Nov. 28, 2012) (on file with author) (citing Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d at 221).
155
Id. at 3 n.4 (citing Metro. Cas. Ins. v. Huhn, 142 S.E. 121, 123 (Ga. 1928)). I myself testified against
Bowers’s view before the Health and Human Services Committee of the Georgia Senate. See Kathleen
Baydala-Joyner, Med-Mal Board Would Be Legal, 3 Say, DAILY REP. (Fulton County, Ga.), Oct. 23, 2013, at
1.
156
The “Unholy Trinity” of employer-friendly tort doctrines discussed above, see supra text
accompanying note 23, only made litigation against employers difficult, not impossible in principle. Moreover,
these doctrines date from the nineteenth century. See Skipp v. E. Ctys. Ry., (1853) 156 Eng. Rep. 95 (Ex.)
(first using the maxim volenti non fit injuria as a master’s defense against a servant); Priestly v. Fowler, (1837)
150 Eng. Rep. 1030 (Ex.) (stating the fellow-servant rule); Butterfield v. Forrester, (1809) 103 Eng. Rep. 926
(K.B.) (first clearly articulating contributory negligence).
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would thus imply the radical result that workers’ comp is unconstitutional.)
But second, even if Bowers is correct about that historical point, his view about
its relevance is contrary to the Crowell–Foster–Huhn rule, which asserts that
the correct inquiry is whether the displacing procedure is post-1798, not
whether the displaced action had juries in 1798.157
E. Doesn’t the Greater Power Include the Lesser?
In all three state systems, various non-fundamental alterations to the
existing system—like keeping a jury but capping damages—have been held
unconstitutional. But I have argued that a major, fundamental change—like
abolishing an action entirely and shifting responsibility for the subject matter
to an agency—is constitutional. Even in the federal system, keeping a case in
an Article III court but abolishing a jury can violate the jury trial right, but
leaving Article III courts entirely and adopting an Article I tribunal that
decides a slightly different legal question doesn’t violate the jury trial right.158
This may seem odd. If a less radical reform is unconstitutional, shouldn’t a
more radical reform—which ignores juries even more fundamentally by not
impaneling them in the first place—be even worse?
But one can answer the question in two ways. First, it’s not clear that the
administrative procedure is in fact a greater imposition on the jury. Caps
(under the view of some courts, as in Nestlehutt)159 allow the jury to make a
determination and then nullify it. The administrative procedure, by contrast,
doesn’t consult juries at all, so there’s no jury determination to nullify.

157
There is one other bit of language in Nestlehutt that could be misinterpreted in a way hostile to the
constitutionality of a med-mal administrative system. In dictum (while rejecting a counterargument), the court
suggested that the jury trial right might attach in an action if it “would constitute an analogue to a 1798
common law cause of action.” Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d at 224. The full quote is: “Nor does, as appellant asserts,
the existence of statutes authorizing double or treble damages attest to the validity of the caps on noneconomic
damages. While it is questionable whether any cause of action involving an award thereof would constitute an
analogue to a 1798 common law cause of action so as to trigger the right to jury trial in the first place, to the
extent the right to jury trial did attach, treble damages do not in any way nullify the jury’s damages award but
rather merely operate upon and thus affirm the integrity of that award.” Id. (emphasis added) (footnotes
omitted). Could med-mal administrative proceedings be considered “analogue[s]” to medical malpractice
common-law suits as they existed in 1798? If so—and if the statement were not dictum—one could read this
language to invalidate the administrative proceeding. But, even if this were not dictum and contrary to the
Foster–Crowell–Huhn rule, it is nonetheless clear that the administrative proceeding, which is not negligencebased, is not an analogue to a common-law med-mal suit.
158
As in Florida. See supra text accompanying note 109.
159
See supra text accompanying notes 147–53.
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Which is worse for the jury? The administrative scheme consults juries
fewer times (i.e., never), but caps nullify jury determinations more times. The
jury has no necessary interest in being consulted more times: after legislatures
abolished the “amatory torts” of adultery, alienation of affections, and criminal
conversation,160 juries were presented with fewer questions, but this was
merely an exercise in the legislature’s power to alter the common law. As
Foster put it, “[n]ew forums may be erected, and new remedies provided,
accommodated to the ever shifting state of society.”161 From the perspective of
the dignity of jury determinations, caps may be worse by asking the jury a
question and then nullifying its answer.
Second—and relatedly—the law is filled with cases in which the
government is prohibited from doing something but not prohibited from doing
something “worse.” For instance, a land-use agency can deny you a permit
entirely, but it can’t attach conditions to the grant of the permit unless there is
an “essential nexus” and “rough proportionality” between the conditions and
the state interest served.162 The public school system could deny you a job as a
schoolteacher altogether, but it can’t grant you the job on the condition that
you refrain from criticizing the government.163 Many conditional grants of
benefits can be unconstitutional164 even though the government isn’t required
to grant the benefit.
The reason is that it isn’t obvious what’s “worse.” Often, the conditional
grant is in fact worse than the denial: getting the job on condition that one not
criticize the government is “better” from the applicant’s point of view than
being denied the job, but “worse” from the perspective of government
manipulation of the marketplace of ideas. Similarly, one may coherently argue
that caps harm the institution of juries in a way that an administrative scheme
doesn’t: by consulting the jury and then nullifying its determination.

160
See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-17 (West 2003) (“Adultery, alienation of affections, or criminal
conversation with a wife or husband shall not give a right of action to the person’s spouse. Rights of action for
adultery, alienation of affections, or criminal conversation are abolished.”).
161
Flint River Steamboat Co. v. Foster, 5 Ga. 194, 208 (1848).
162
See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 386 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S.
825, 837 (1987).
163
See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
164
See generally Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term—Foreword: Unconstitutional
Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1988) (discussing the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV.
1413 (1989) (same).
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III. ACCESS-TO-COURTS AND RIGHT-TO-A-REMEDY PROVISIONS
We’ve seen that the Florida and Alabama supreme courts have upheld tortreform measures under the jury trial clause, while making clear that the
measures might yet violate different provisions, like access-to-courts or rightto-a-remedy clauses.165 And, indeed, where an access-to-courts clause exists, it
has often been interpreted fairly broadly to invalidate a variety of types of tort
reform.166 Access-to-courts provisions are entirely absent from the Federal
Constitution, where a statute abolishing certain causes of action would just be
evaluated under the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses.167 Or, rather, the
U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the Federal Constitution to include an
access-to-courts right, but it’s limited to the formal right to access a court168
and doesn’t protect any substantive rights. This sort of provision is also absent
from the Georgia Constitution.169
This suggests that the med-mal administrative compensation scheme might
run into access-to-courts problems in Florida and Alabama. This Part discusses
the access-to-courts and right-to-a-remedy cases in those two states,
concluding that the med-mal compensation scheme is likely constitutional.
Section A discusses how the Florida courts have developed a fairly
coherent framework for evaluating access-to-courts claims—the Kluger test.
Section A.1 gives an overview of the test, which has two prongs. Section A.2
discusses prong one of the Kluger test, which looks to whether the legislature
has provided a reasonable alternative to the abolished action. Section A.3
discusses prong two of the Kluger test, which looks to whether (if no
reasonable alternative exists) the abolition was justified by overpowering
public necessity.
Section B discusses how, by contrast, the Alabama case law lacks
coherence and is in a state of disarray. This section breaks down the Alabama
case law into the early cases that provided little protection against prospective
changes in the law (section B.1), the period of time when Alabama courts
165

See supra text accompanying notes 105, 123.
See, e.g., Bryan et al., supra note 12, at 155; Duff, supra note 26, at 162–72; Jones, supra note 12, at
97, 102–03. On such clauses generally, see Thomas R. Phillips, Speech, The Constitutional Right to a Remedy,
78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1309 (2003).
167
See infra Section IV.A.
168
See, e.g., Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977); McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 292 U.S. 230,
233 (1934); Chambers v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907).
169
See, e.g., State v. Moseley, 436 S.E.2d 632, 634 (Ga. 1993) (declining to find a substantive right
against legislative alterations of causes of action in the Georgia Constitution’s “right to prosecute or
defend . . . [one’s] own cause in any of the courts of this state” (quoting GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. XII)).
166
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applied a stricter mode of analysis (section B.2), and the more recent decisions
that have seemed to apply conflicting strands of case law simultaneously
(section B.3).
A. The Florida Access-to-Courts Clause
1. The Kluger Test
The Florida Constitution states that “[t]he courts shall be open to every
person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered without sale,
denial or delay.”170
In Kluger v. White, a section of the Florida Automobile Reparations Act
was challenged under this access-to-courts provision.171 The challenged section
abolished tort actions for property damage arising from car accidents:
henceforth, one’s own insurance would generally have to pay for one’s
property damages.172 One exception was that motorists who didn’t buy
property damage insurance could still sue if their damage was above $550.173
Motorists not insured for property damage thus couldn’t sue at all if their
damages were $550 or less.174
One could imagine a number of reactions to such an abolition of a
traditional common-law cause of action. At one extreme, one could hold that
the legislature could never abolish a right of action without providing an
alternative. At the other extreme, one could hold that the legislature could
“destroy a traditional and long-standing cause of action upon mere legislative
whim,”175 or that the existence of some alternative (no matter how inadequate)
would always justify such an abolition. The Florida Supreme Court adopted
neither of these extremes, and instead held:
[W]here a right of access to the courts for redress for a particular
injury has been provided by statutory law predating the adoption of
the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of the State of Florida,
or where such right has become a part of the common law of the
[s]tate . . . ,176 the [l]egislature is without power to abolish such a
170

FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21.
281 So. 2d 1, 2 (Fla. 1973).
172
See id.
173
See id. at 3.
174
See id.
175
Id. at 4.
176
At this point, the Kluger court cites Florida Statutes section 2.01, which adopts the common law of
England as of July 4, 1776. Nonetheless, Florida cases seem to look to whether the common-law right existed
171
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right without providing a reasonable alternative to protect the rights
of the people of the [s]tate to redress for injuries, unless the
[l]egislature can show an overpowering public necessity for the
abolishment of such right, and no alternative method of meeting such
public necessity can be shown.177

There are thus two ways to justify abolishing a traditional common-law
right: (1) providing a reasonable alternative or (2) showing an overpowering
public necessity that can’t be met by any alternative method.178
In this case, it was clear that, for uninsured motorists suffering $550 or less
in property damage, the traditional common-law action was totally abolished
with no alternative procedure at all, nor did the legislature make a case for
overpowering public necessity.179 Therefore, the court had no trouble finding
that this section violated the access-to-courts right.180
The Kluger approach to determining whether a denial of judicial remedies
violates the access-to-courts provision has now become standard.181
How would the administrative med-mal patient compensation system fare
under the Kluger test? It should be on fairly solid ground on prong one, as the
Florida Supreme Court has shown itself rather willing—even recently—to
uphold alternative compensation schemes. The administrative scheme offers
real benefits to injured patients: the new legal standard will probably be
somewhat easier to meet than the traditional negligence standard. And even if
as of 1968. See Estate of McCall v. United States, 134 So. 3d 894, 915 (Fla. 2014) (plurality opinion); Smith v.
Dep’t of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1087 (Fla. 1987); Lifemark Hosps. of Fla., Inc. v. Afonso, 4 So. 3d 764, 769
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
177
Kluger, 281 So. 2d at 4. States differ on whether their right-to-a-remedy clause applies to statutory
rights in addition to common-law rights. See Phillips, supra note 166, at 1337 (first citing Olson v. Ford Motor
Co., 558 N.W.2d 491, 497 (Minn. 1997); then citing Moreno v. Sterling Drug Inc., 787 S.W.2d 348, 355 (Tex.
1990); and then citing Kluger, 281 So. 2d at 4).
178
See also Nicole M. Zomberg, Comment, Workers Compensation Law: Constitutionality of the 1993
Kansas Workers Compensation Act, 37 WASHBURN L.J. 829, 829, 838 (1998) (citing Injured Workers v.
Franklin, 942 P.2d 591, 603 (Kan. 1997)) (similar two-part test in Kansas under due process analysis); id. at
842 (citing Franklin, 942 P.2d at 603) (in Kansas, the first prong resembles rational basis for equal protection).
179
Kluger, 281 So. 2d at 4–5.
180
Id. at 5.
181
See infra Sections III.A.2–3. There is, of course, the antecedent question of whether the right in
question is abolished outright, or merely curtailed. See, e.g., Bauld v. J.A. Jones Constr. Co., 357 So. 2d 401,
402–03 (Fla. 1978) (upholding a statute whose effect in that case was merely to reduce the period within which
a suit could be filed from four years to three and a half years). Also, the Kluger rule doesn’t apply to the
abolition of affirmative defenses. See Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Associated Indus. of Fla., Inc., 678
So. 2d 1239, 1253 (Fla. 1996). In the case of the med-mal system, the right is definitely abolished; moreover,
here we’re considering challenges from potential plaintiffs, not from potential defendants. So for purposes of
challenges by plaintiffs, we go directly to the Kluger test.
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the legal standard were the same, the cost of the administrative system to the
patient would be lower and the speed of resolution of claims would be greater,
which means more claims would be processed more quickly and with greater
certainty.
On prong two—should it come to that—the administrative scheme could
likewise do well, since the court is willing to defer to legislative judgment on
overpowering public necessity. However, on this prong, courts will probe
whether there’s an alternative method, so even if a public necessity is found,
the administrative scheme may still be struck down. Therefore, if the
legislature wants to be more certain that the system will be upheld, it should be
appropriately clear in the legislative language that there’s not only an
overwhelming public necessity but also that there’s no alternative method.
2. Kluger Prong One: Reasonable Alternative
Various cases since Kluger have relied on the first approach, finding that
the challenged statute provided a “reasonable alternative” or “commensurate
benefit”182 in exchange for the denial of court access.
a. Workers’ Comp Fares Very Well Under Kluger Prong One
The Kluger court itself wrote that the workers’ compensation statute was
valid because, in “abolish[ing] the right to sue one’s employer in tort for a jobrelated injury, [it] provided adequate, sufficient, and even preferable
safeguards.”183 After all, the point of the workers’ comp system was, among
other things, “to replace an unwieldy tort system that made it virtually
impossible for businesses to predict or insure for the cost of industrial
accidents.”184
The later cases—too many to discuss at length185—have virtually
unanimously agreed that the workers’ comp system is fully consistent with the
182

Smith v. Dep’t of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1088 (Fla. 1987).
Kluger, 281 So. 2d at 4; see also Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802, 805 (Fla. 1976) (generally
mentioning validity of workers’ comp); Mullarkey v. Fla. Feed Mills, Inc., 268 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 1972) (preKluger case generally upholding aspects of workers’ comp law without being clear on the precise
constitutional challenge rejected).
184
De Ayala v. Fla. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins., 543 So. 2d 204, 206 (Fla. 1989) (citing McLean v. Mundy,
81 So. 2d 501, 503 (Fla. 1955)).
185
See Fabre v. Marin, 623 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 1993); Smith, 507 So. 2d at 1091; Walker & LaBerge, Inc.
v. Halligan, 344 So. 2d 239, 244 (Fla. 1977); Scholastic Sys., Inc. v. LeLoup, 307 So. 2d 166, 168–69 (Fla.
1974); Strohm v. Hertz Corp./Hertz Claim Mgmt., 685 So. 2d 37, 39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Burdick v.
Bob’s Space Racers, 659 So. 2d 351, 352 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Montgomery Ward v. Lovell, 652 So. 2d
183
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access-to-courts right under prong one of Kluger.186 This is good news for the
med-mal administrative scheme.
Most significantly, over a series of several decisions, the court has
continued to uphold the workers’ comp statute under prong one of Kluger—
even when a class of benefits was denied entirely to particular groups or people
or when legislative changes made the system less generous. The cases
discussed below—Acton, Sasso, Newton, and Martinez—suggest that the bar
for the adequacy of the alternative scheme isn’t very high.187
In Acton v. Fort Lauderdale Hospital, the court considered a change to the
workers’ comp system whereby “lump sum payments for permanent partial
disability” were no longer available.188 Instead, now “permanent impairment”
benefits were available only for three types of injuries (“amputation[s], loss of
vision, or serious facial or head disfigurements”), leaving only “wage-loss
benefits” for other types of partial disability.189 The court upheld this change
against an access-to-courts challenge, writing that such a change “may
disadvantage some workers” but “offers greater benefits” to others.190 “The
Workers’ Compensation Law,” the Acton court wrote, “continues to afford
substantial advantages to injured workers, including full medical care and
wage-loss payments for total or partial disability without their having to endure
the delay and uncertainty of tort litigation.”191 The appellate court whose
judgment was affirmed in Acton had similarly written:
Workers’ compensation provides a more certain, although not as
lucrative, payment to the injured worker. Litigation expenses,
509, 512 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Rodriguez v. Prestress Decking Corp., 611 So. 2d 59 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1992); Whitely v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 454 So. 2d 63, 65 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
186
The Florida Supreme Court did invalidate the employer immunity to the extent it prevented the
employer from being sued by a third-party tortfeasor—there, the workers’ comp statute did extinguish a right
to sue without any reasonable alternative. Sunspan Eng’g & Constr. Co. v. Spring-Lock Scaffolding Co., 310
So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1975); see also City of Clearwater v. L.M. Duncan & Sons, Inc., 466 So. 2d 1116, 1118 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1985). In another case, an appellate court had to interpret the statute to avoid possible
unconstitutionality related to the very idiosyncratic context of the interaction between workers’ comp and
incarceration. Monroe Furniture Co. v. Bonner, 509 So. 2d 1264, 1266 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987). But these
cases are both far from the core of the workers’ comp statute: none of them relates to the immunity of the
employer from suit by the employee for on-the-job injuries.
187
See also Bradley v. Hurricane Rest., 670 So. 2d 162, 163–64 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (upholding a
provision providing for a benefit of 66% of wages in the case of total temporary disability, then half of that
after reaching maximum medical improvement).
188
440 So. 2d 1282, 1284 (Fla. 1983).
189
Id. at 1283–84.
190
Id. at 1284.
191
Id.; see also Mahoney v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 440 So. 2d 1285, 1286 (Fla. 1983); Beauregard v.
Commonwealth Elec., 440 So. 2d 460 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
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including those borne by the claimant[,] are reduced by the
administrative handling of claims. Litigation delays are also reduced.
The cost of inevitable injury is spread throughout the industry. The
employee is further benefited by not having any recoverable damages
reduced by the proportionate fault of the employee. Certainty and
efficiency are given in exchange for potential recovery. This satisfies
the requirements of [a]rticle I, [s]ection 21, Florida Constitution.192

In Sasso v. Ram Property Management, the court even upheld a provision
of the workers’ comp statute denying wage-loss benefits entirely to claimants
above age sixty-five,193 reasoning:
[The claimant’s] medical expenses were covered by workers’
compensation benefits, and he received temporary total disability
benefits during his convalescence. Permanent total disability benefits
were available to him if he had qualified and any future medical
expenses related to his injury are also covered. [The claimant] thus
has received some of the compensation which a tort suit might have
provided had he been forced to pay his own expenses and
subsequently seek redress in court. Such partial remedy does not
constitute an abolition of rights without reasonable alternative as
contemplated in Kluger v. White.194

And in Martinez v. Scanlan, the court considered a challenge to the 1990
revisions to the workers’ comp statute.195 The challengers had “claim[ed] that,
because the cumulative effect [of the revision was] to substantially reduce
preexisting benefits to employees without providing any countervailing
advantages,” the workers’ comp statute was “no longer a reasonable alternative
to common-law remedies” and thus violated the access-to-courts provision.196
The Florida Supreme Court disagreed:
Although [the revised statute] undoubtedly reduces benefits to
eligible workers, the workers’ compensation law remains a
reasonable alternative to tort litigation. It continues to provide injured
workers with full medical care and wage-loss payments for total or
192
Acton v. Ft. Lauderdale Hosp., 418 So. 2d 1099, 1101 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982), aff’d, 440 So. 2d
1282 (Fla. 1983); see also Noel v. M. Ecker & Co., 422 So. 2d 1062, 1063 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
193
452 So. 2d 932, 933 (Fla. 1984).
194
Id. at 933–34; see Morrow v. Amcon Concrete, Inc., 433 So. 2d 1230, 1232 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983); see also Newton v. McCotter Motors, Inc., 475 So. 2d 230, 231 (Fla. 1985) (approving of and
incorporating a district court analysis that relied on Acton, Sasso, and Morrow, where the challenged statute
denied compensation for deaths that followed accidents by more than five years); Wood v. Harry Harmon
Insulation, 511 So. 2d 690, 693 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (relying on McCotter, where the statute provided a
350-week limitation for occupational diseases rather than accidents).
195
582 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 1991).
196
Id. at 1171.
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partial disability regardless of fault and without the delay and
uncertainty of tort litigation. Furthermore, while there are situations
where an employee would be eligible for benefits under the pre-1990
workers’ compensation law and now, as a result of [the revisions], is
no longer eligible, that employee is not without a remedy. There still
may remain the viable alternative of tort litigation in these
instances.197 As to this attack, the statute passes constitutional
muster.198

The general idea is encapsulated in Eller v. Shova.199 In Eller, the court
upheld a provision increasing the degree of negligence one had to prove to
successfully sue policymaking employees (when workers’ comp was already
available).200 The court cited with approval the dissenting judge in the lower
court, who had written: “I conclude that, so long as the benefits are
substantial, workers’ compensation benefits are an acceptable, reasonable
alternative to most tort remedies that were available to an employee in 1968
against both employers and coemployees.”201
b. Other Alternative Schemes Are Also Treated Charitably Under Prong
One
Workers’ comp isn’t the only access-to-court-limiting system that has been
upheld under prong one of Kluger. In addition to Lasky v. State Farm
Insurance—a case, like Kluger, about auto accident litigation and insurance—
the Florida Supreme Court has upheld alternative schemes in the context of the
Citrus Canker Eradication Program, medical malpractice, and the Florida
Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan. Notably, the last of
these cases is from 2013, so the court’s willingness to approve reasonable
alternatives to court litigation continues to this very day.
In Lasky v. State Farm Insurance, the court upheld a different section of
the same statute that was at issue in Kluger.202 While the section challenged in
Kluger didn’t require motorists to carry property insurance, the section
challenged in Lasky did require insurance, and denied tort immunity for car
197
The court said in a footnote: “We are referring to, for example, amendments to provisions regarding
recreational and social activities, personal comfort, travelling employees, and the going and coming rule.” Id.
at 1172 n.4.
198
Id. at 1171–72.
199
630 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 1993).
200
See id. at 538, 542.
201
Id. at 542 (emphasis added) (quoting Shova v. Eller, 606 So. 2d 400, 408 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)
(Altenbernd, J., dissenting)); see also Iglesia v. Floran, 394 So. 2d 994 (Fla. 1981).
202
296 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974).
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owners who lacked the required insurance.203 In addition, the section made
pain and suffering damages unavailable unless there was at least $1,000 in
medical benefits, a permanent injury or death occurred, or certain listed
injuries (such as fractures of weight-bearing bones or compound fractures)
were present.204
The section challenged in Lasky thus contained a combination of insurance
requirements, immunities, and abolition of tort actions. Of course, the abolition
of a tort suit from the plaintiff’s perspective means an immunity from suit from
the defendants’ perspective—and, in auto accidents, plaintiffs and defendants
are largely the same group. This ended up being important: Motorists lost a tort
action but also gained a tort immunity, which was the “reasonable alternative”
required by Kluger. In exchange for forgoing certain rights to sue on a
negligence theory, the accident victim would get not only “speedy payment by
his own insurer of medical costs, lost wages, etc.”—even when he himself was
at fault—but also an immunity from suit for those elements of damages (to the
extent of the victim’s policy limits), as well as an immunity from suit for pain
and suffering damages in those cases where they were unavailable.205 This
quid pro quo was enough to distinguish Lasky from Kluger and save the
statutory section from an access-to-courts challenge.
The same pattern can be observed in the following cases involving
administrative agencies or medical malpractice.
In Department of Agricultural & Consumer Services v. Bonanno, the court
upheld the Citrus Canker Eradication Program’s compensation system.206
Under that program, citrus growers whose diseased plants were destroyed
could seek compensation only through an administrative hearings process with
exclusive appellate review in the First District Court of Appeal.207 The
Bonanno court added that the statute even granted additional benefits that
wouldn’t otherwise be available, like a minimum value for destroyed plants
and compensation for claims that would otherwise be time-barred.208
In University of Miami v. Echarte, the court considered a statute providing
that in medical malpractice cases, if a plaintiff rejected a defendant’s offer to
participate in binding arbitration, noneconomic damages at trial would be
203
204
205
206
207
208

See id. at 13–14.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 14.
568 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 1990).
Id. at 27.
Id. at 30.
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capped at $350,000.209 The court upheld the statute, holding that the reasonable
alternative was “the opportunity to receive prompt recovery [through binding
arbitration] without the risk and uncertainty of litigation or having to prove
fault in a civil trial.”210 The statute regulated the arbitration process in ways
that the court held were pro-plaintiff: by providing time limits for the
defendant’s investigation to determine its own liability, by requiring that the
defendant “provide a verified written medical expert opinion corroborating a
lack of reasonable grounds to show a negligent injury” before “deny[ing] the
claimant’s reasonable grounds for finding medical negligence,” by establishing
a “relaxed evidentiary standard” and “joint and several liability,” and so on.211
The court found that this system restricted the claimant’s rights less than
workers’ comp—since, unlike in workers’ comp, some noneconomic damages
were compensable. Admittedly, this system (unlike workers’ comp) wasn’t nofault, but the court reasoned that a no-fault system is harder to implement for
medical malpractice than for workplace injuries.212
In Samples v. Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation
Ass’n, the court considered the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury
Compensation Plan, which provided for a $100,000 no-fault payment for
parents of a child born with a birth-related neurological injury.213 The court
held that:
The Plan as a whole—including the parental award provision—
provides an alternative remedy to the uncertain and speculative
compensation parents might receive through traditional tort remedies.
As well as providing the $100,000 parental award, the Plan
specifically provides for particular expenses incurred by parents due
to the child’s injury. Additionally, the Plan does not act as the
exclusive remedy in cases “where there is clear and convincing
evidence of bad faith or malicious purpose or willful and wanton
disregard of human rights, safety, or property.”214

3. Kluger Prong Two: Public Necessity
Just in case the med-mal administrative scheme isn’t validated at prong one
of Kluger (as providing a reasonable alternative), it’s helpful to observe the
209

618 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 1993).
Id. at 194.
211
Id.
212
Id. at 194–95.
213
114 So. 3d 912, 921 (Fla. 2013).
214
Id. at 921 (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.303(2) (West 2010)); see also Macri v. Clements &
Ashmore, P.A., 15 So. 3d 762, 766 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
210
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fate of access-to-court-limiting systems under prong two, which requires an
overpowering public necessity with no alternative method.215
Obviously, a statute that on its face restricts access and doesn’t even bother
showing necessity fails both prongs of Kluger and is struck down easily.216 But
when the act does recite findings of overwhelming public necessity, especially
when supported by a task force study or something similar, these findings are
likely to get deference from courts.217 Still, the “no alternative method”
subprong can be restrictive. Courts can be willing to second-guess whether the
necessity identified could have been addressed without limiting access to
courts, so it’s probably prudent for the legislative findings to explicitly state
that the new scheme is a unified approach, along the lines of the Echarte
decision discussed below.
As an example of the second prong, the Kluger court itself referred to the
1945 abolition of the damages actions for “alienation of affections, criminal
conversation, seduction or breach of promise.”218 As the court had explained in
Rotwein v. Gersten,219 the legislature showed public necessity by explaining, in
the preface to the statute abolishing the actions, that these actions had
been subject to grave abuses, causing extreme annoyance,
embarrassment, humiliation and pecuniary damages to many persons
wholly innocent and free from wrongdoing, that they have been
exercised by the unscrupulous for their own enrichment and that the
best interests of the people of Florida will be served by the abolition
of such remedies.220

The Rotwein court continued, in language quoted and approved in Kluger:
The causes of action proscribed by the act under review were a
part of the common law and have long been a part of the law of the
country. They have no doubt served a good purpose, but when they

215
See Phillips, supra note 166, at 1336 (noting the “overpowering public necessity” standard that exists
in some states).
216
See, e.g., Mitchell v. Moore, 786 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 2001); Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. v. Pinnacle Med.,
Inc., 753 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 2000); Smith v. Dep’t of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1987); Overland Constr. Co. v.
Sirmons, 369 So. 2d 572, 574–75 (Fla. 1979); Sunspan Eng’g & Constr. Co. v. Spring-Lock Scaffolding Co.,
310 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1975); City of Clearwater v. L.M. Duncan & Sons, Inc., 466 So. 2d 1116, 1118 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1985). Some of these cases, like Sunspan and Clearwater, involved the workers’ comp statute, but
they arose far from the core of workers’ comp—in the specialized context of the employer’s amenability to
suit by third-party tortfeasors, not by employees.
217
See infra text accompanying notes 222–34.
218
281 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1973).
219
36 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 1948) (en banc).
220
Id. at 420.
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become an instrument of extortion and blackmail, the legislature has
the power to, and may, limit or abolish them.221

Maybe Rotwein isn’t a good example because it doesn’t clearly show how
the “no alternative method” subprong works. But Psychiatric Associates v.
Siegel222 is a better example, and shows how the “no alternative method”
subprong can be restrictive.
In that case, the court struck down a statute “requir[ing] a plaintiff bringing
an action against someone who participated in a medical review board process
to post a bond sufficient to cover the defendant’s costs and attorney’s fees.”223
On prong one, there was clearly no reasonable alternative to the court action
for those who couldn’t post the bond; “the statutes lack[ed] reciprocity because
they [did] not require defendants to pay a plaintiff’s costs and attorney’s fees if
the claim prove[d] meritorious.”224
As to the second prong, the court found that:
[T]he legislature enacted the bond requirement statutes pursuant to an
overpowering public purpose. The Task Force’s report and the
legislature’s preamble to enacting the bond requirements clearly
outline the existence of a medical malpractice crisis in the state. The
legislature acted within its police powers to protect the health and
welfare of its citizens by enactment of the statutes.225

But the court struck the statute down anyway because “the record in the case
[did] not show that the bond requirement [was] the only method of meeting the
medical malpractice crisis and encouraging peer review.”226
Siegel shows the importance of having the statute recite legislative findings
not only that there was an overwhelming public necessity but also that there
was no alternative method. University of Miami v. Echarte227 is a good
example of this. We’ve already seen Echarte at prong one: this is the challenge
to the statute that capped medical malpractice noneconomic damages at trial
after the plaintiff rejected the defendant’s binding arbitration request.228

221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228

Kluger, 281 So. 2d at 4 (quoting Rotwein, 36 So. 2d at 421).
610 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 1992).
Id. at 421.
Id. at 424.
Id. (footnote omitted).
Id. at 425.
618 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 1993).
See supra text accompanying notes 209–12.
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Right after upholding the statute under the first prong, the court also upheld
it under the second prong (though this wasn’t strictly necessary). The
legislature had recited factual findings about the extent of a medical
malpractice insurance crisis in the preamble of the statute; these were based on
the findings of the Academic Task Force for Review of the Insurance and Tort
Systems (Task Force), which the legislature had established by statute.229 The
lower court had held that the legislature hadn’t shown the necessary
“overpowering public necessity,” but the supreme court disagreed:
The [l]egislature has the final word on declarations on public policy,
and the courts are bound to give great weight to legislative
determinations of facts. Further, legislative determinations of public
purpose and facts are presumed correct and entitled to deference,
unless clearly erroneous. Because the [l]egislature’s factual and
policy findings are presumed correct and there has been no showing
that the findings in the instant case are clearly erroneous, we hold
that the [l]egislature has shown that an “overpowering public
necessity” exists.230

As for whether there was an alternative method, the lower court had held
that this subprong wasn’t satisfied because the legislature hadn’t expressly
found that no alternative method existed.231 The supreme court disagreed
because the Task Force had stated that “‘reforms of the civil justice system, of
the medical regulatory system, and of the insurance system complement each
other’ and that ‘[a]ll are necessary to address the complex problems with
multiple causes analyzed in [its report].’”232 Thus, it was necessary to consider
“the plan as a whole, rather than focusing on one specific part of the plan.”233
After rejecting a particular claim by the challengers—that “strengthen[ing]
professional discipline of physicians with numerous claims” would have been
sufficient to meet the public necessity—the court concluded that “no
alternative or less onerous method of meeting the crisis has been shown.”234

229

Echarte, 618 So. 2d at 191 n.11, 196.
Id. at 196–97 (citations omitted) (first quoting Univ. of Miami v. Echarte, 585 So. 2d 293, 301 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1991); then citing Am. Liberty Ins. v. W. & Conyers Architects & Eng’rs, 491 So. 2d 573 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1986); then citing State v. Div. of Bond Fin., 495 So. 2d 183 (Fla. 1986); and then citing Miami
Home Milk Producers Ass’n v. Milk Control Bd., 169 So. 541 (Fla. 1936)).
231
See id. at 197.
232
Id. (first alteration in original) (citing ACAD. TASK FORCE FOR REVIEW OF THE INS. & TORT SYS.,
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE RECOMMENDATIONS 9 (1987)).
233
Id.
234
Id.; see also Estate of McCall v. United States, 134 So. 3d 894, 933–36 (Fla. 2014) (Polston, C.J.,
dissenting).
230
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Recently, in Estate of McCall v. United States, a plurality opinion of the
Florida Supreme Court engaged in an extremely searching review of the
legislative findings supporting a cap on noneconomic damages—concluding
that the supposed medical insurance crisis supporting the cap was illusory.235
But that plurality opinion represents the views of only two out of seven
justices: Justices Lewis and Labarga.236
Nonetheless, both the plurality and the concurrence in the result—five out
of seven justices in all—agreed that if a crisis can justify a particular scheme,
that scheme may no longer be justifiable once the crisis is over.237 Even though
the three concurring justices would have given substantially more deference to
legislative findings than the two plurality justices, greater deference may not
be good enough if it’s obvious (one day) that a crisis is past and there’s no
evidence to support the continuing necessity of the scheme. So, just to be safe,
any recitation of legislative need should include not only descriptions of a
crisis that might someday pass (like a medical insurance crisis) but also eternal
problems of negligence-based actions, which have been with us for as long as
the negligence system has been in existence: the randomness and arbitrariness
of negligence determinations and damages judgments imposed by juries
without any medical expertise.238
B. Alabama’s Right to a Remedy and Access to Courts
Article I, section 13 of the Alabama Constitution states: “That all courts
shall be open; and that every person, for any injury done him, in his lands,
goods, person, or reputation, shall have a remedy by due process of law;
and right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial, or delay.”239
The section 13 case law is confusing, and to this day there doesn’t seem to
be a consensus approach on how to apply section 13. It makes more sense if
one understands the history of the doctrine, so here is a short history.

235
McCall arose in the context of an equal protection challenge and is discussed further in that section.
See infra Section IV.C. But the court’s attitude toward deference to legislative factual findings in equal
protection cases is likely to influence its attitude in access-to-courts cases.
236
Compare McCall, 134 So. 3d at 905–12 (plurality opinion) (reexamining factual bases of statute),
with id. at 921–22 (Pariente, J., concurring in the result) (disapproving of this reexamination), and id. at 931–
32 (Polston, C.J., dissenting).
237
See id. at 913–15 (plurality opinion); id. at 920–21 (Pariente, J., concurring in the result).
238
See supra text accompanying notes 1–3.
239
ALA. CONST. art. I, § 13; see also Ford & Abernathy, supra note 24, at 51.
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The main feature of the history is that, in the early cases, the court applied
a “vested rights” approach, under which the legislature could restrict or abolish
any common-law cause of action as long as it did so prospectively. In the late
1970s and early 1980s, the court switched course and adopted the “commonlaw rights” approach, under which the legislature couldn’t abolish a commonlaw right unless (1) there was a voluntary quid pro quo or (2) the legislature
was using its police power to eradicate a perceived social evil. The second
prong was applied several times without much deference to legislative
judgment, but other cases do defer to the legislature. Occasional cases continue
to use the vested-rights approach, and several cases have listed the vestedrights and common-law-rights approaches as though they were both good law.
As a result, there is continuing uncertainty about the true state of doctrine
in this area, and for purposes of the med-mal administrative scheme, who
knows what rule might be applied.
1. The Early Cases
The early cases analyzing section 13 (or its equivalents under prior
constitutions) adopted a number of principles. First, statutes that don’t abolish
a cause of action but merely regulate or tax it are upheld.240 Second, causes of
action aren’t extinguished unless a statute has explicitly said so.241 Third, one
can waive one’s rights, so statutes that provide a voluntary alternative to one’s
common-law rights are upheld.242
And fourth—and most importantly—the legislature can abolish a commonlaw right, as long as it does so prospectively; section 13 only provides
protection if the right was “vested,” i.e., if the cause of action had accrued
before the legislature abolished it.
Thus, in Pickett v. Matthews, the court analyzed a statute abolishing the
liability of a car driver for injuries to guests transported without payment,
unless there was willful or wanton conduct.243 The Supreme Court of Alabama
wrote:

240
See, e.g., Plant v. R.L. Reid, Inc., 313 So. 2d 518, 522–23 (Ala. 1975); Swann v. Kidd, 79 Ala. 431
(1885) (per curiam); Martin’s Executrix v. Martin, 25 Ala. 201 (1854).
241
See, e.g., Ivey v. Dixon Inv. Co., 219 So. 2d 639 (Ala. 1969); Henley v. Rockett, 8 So. 2d 852 (Ala.
1942); Gentry v. Swann Chem. Co., 174 So. 530 (Ala. 1937), abrogated by Ex Parte Harris, 590 So. 2d 285
(Ala. 1991).
242
See Gentry, 174 So. 2d at 534; Chapman v. Ry. Fuel Co., 101 So. 879, 881 (Ala. 1924).
243
192 So. 261 (Ala. 1939).
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It will be noticed that [section 13] preserves the right to a remedy for
an injury. That means that when a duty has been breached producing
a legal claim for damages, such claimant cannot be denied the benefit
of his claim for the absence of a remedy. But this provision does not
undertake to preserve existing duties against legislative change made
before the breach occurs.244

The vested-rights approach is, of course, very charitable to statutory
regimes that abolish common-law actions and replace them with administrative
proceedings, as long as the regime works prospectively only. So the Alabama
bill would likely be upheld if the vested-rights approach were applied.245
Some years before Pickett, the court had upheld the workers’ comp law on
a similar theory. Chapman v. Railway Fuel Co. upheld the statute on a
voluntary waiver theory.246 The challenger there had also argued that the act
wasn’t really voluntary, because “it undertakes to control the rights of
employer and employee, even though both elect not to come under its
provisions, in the one case by abolishing defenses, in the other by remitting the
employee to his common-law rights and remedies.”247 But even then, the court
wrote, “no one has any vested right under the Constitution to the maintenance
of common-law doctrines in statutory provisions regulating the relations
between employer and employee in respect of rights and liabilities growing out
of accidental injuries.”248 Thus, the right to a remedy, in its vested-rights
aspect, provides no protection against prospective legislative changes in the
common law.249
2. The Turn to Stricter Analysis
If a med-mal administrative scheme had been passed in 1977, one would
clearly expect it to be upheld (as to later injuries) based on the vested-rights
approach of the section 13 case law. True, it abolishes causes of action rather
than merely regulating them, and it does not establish a voluntary regime. But

244

Id. at 263.
See S. 413, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 12(a) (Ala. 2016).
246
Chapman, 101 So. at 880–81.
247
Id. at 881.
248
Id.; see also Slagle v. Reynolds Metals Co., 344 So. 2d 1216, 1218 (Ala. 1977) (dismissing the
section 13 argument without any analysis except for a citation to Chapman).
249
According to Reed v. Brunson, 527 So. 2d 102, 108 (Ala. 1988), the vested-rights approach in section
13 cases goes all the way back to Coosa River Steamboat Co. v. Barclay & Henderson, 30 Ala. 120 (1857),
and Peevey v. Cabaniss, 70 Ala. 253 (1881).
245
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it’s a policy clearly stated by the legislature, and, most importantly, it’s valid
as long as it operates purely prospectively.250
But the section 13 cases took a turn for the stricter between 1978 and 1982,
with the Grantham–Fireman’s Fund–Lankford trilogy of cases. In Grantham v.
Denke, the court examined the aspect of the workers’ comp law that abolished
an injured employee’s recovery against an officer, director, or fellow employee
of the company.251 That the employee’s right of recovery against the company
was now replaced by an administrative action was fine—it was a voluntary
quid pro quo, and that elective aspect of the statute reconciled it with section
13.252 But “[t]he quid pro quo is solely between employer and employee”;253 as
to third parties, including officers or fellow employees, there was no elective
substitute remedy that would justify depriving the injured worker of his
common law remedies.254 Nor was the statute an exercise of the state’s police
power to eradicate a “perceived social evil,”255 as was the case with the motor
vehicle guest statute upheld in Pickett.256
Grantham was clearly a departure from the older approach: the vestedrights approach seemed to have been abandoned. The injury in Grantham
occurred after the statute was passed,257 so Pickett’s vested-rights approach
should have controlled; but instead, the fellow-employee immunity section was
invalidated, and Pickett was reinterpreted as being justified by the state’s need
to use its police power to eradicate a perceived social evil.258
After Grantham, though, the law remained uncertain, since the vestedrights approach wasn’t really abandoned. Just the next year, in Mayo v.
Rouselle Corp., the court examined a statute providing a four-year statute of
limitations for breach of contract for sale.259 One might think that the statute
would be easily upheld based on the very traditional view that it is
constitutional to regulate (rather than abolish) a common-law cause of

250

See Ala. S. 413 § 12(a).
359 So. 2d 785 (Ala. 1978).
252
Id. at 787 (first citing Gentry v. Swann Chem. Co., 174 So. 530 (Ala. 1937); then citing Chapman,
101 So. 879).
253
Id. (emphasis omitted).
254
Id. at 788.
255
Id.
256
See Pickett v. Matthews, 192 So. 261, 266 (Ala. 1939).
257
See Reed v. Brunson, 527 So. 2d 102, 109 (Ala. 1988).
258
See Grantham, 359 So. 2d at 788.
259
375 So. 2d 449 (Ala. 1979).
251
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action.260 And the court did indeed uphold the statute, but on a different theory:
the supposedly discredited vested-rights theory. The court held that section 13
“preserves to all persons a remedy for accrued or vested causes of action.
Therefore, the right to bring an action for breach of warranty by a third person
can be modified, limited or repealed as the legislature sees fit, except where
such cause of action has already accrued.”261 And this was the year after
Grantham had apparently abandoned the vested-rights theory!
Also, the vested-rights theory remained viable in cases in which it was
statutory rights being abolished, not common-law rights. Grantham had struck
down the workers’ comp law’s grant of immunity for coworkers, but in Slagle
v. Parker, the court held that coworker immunity was still valid for wrongful
death actions.262 Wrongful death actions were unknown to the common law
(where your tort claims died with you) and are products of statute: therefore,
the wrongful death action “can be modified, limited, or repealed as the
legislature sees fit, except as to causes of action which have already
accrued.”263
The court continued to not give much guidance on section 13 cases. In
Thompson v. Wiik, Reimer & Sweet, the court upheld a statute generally
barring contracts in restraint of a lawful profession (i.e., non-compete
agreements).264 The court held that the legislature has the “prerogative to effect
public policy relative to such contractual rights and obligations,” and that
“[s]ection 13 only restricts the legislature from making unreasonable, arbitrary
and oppressive modifications of fundamental rights contemplated by
[section 13’s] constitutional guarantees.”265 But this endorsement of an
“unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive” standard was the year after the court,
in Mayo, had declined to rely on a similar standard for judging the validity of
statutes of limitations under section 13.
Starting with Fireman’s Fund American Insurance v. Coleman,266 the court
began to take steps toward potentially clarifying doctrine. Grantham had
decided that injured employees could still sue their fellow employees but
260
See Reese v. Rankin Fite Mem’l Hosp., 403 So. 2d 158, 162–63 (Ala. 1981) (Jones, J., concurring
specially); Plant v. R.L. Reid, Inc., 313 So. 2d 518, 522–23 (Ala. 1975).
261
Mayo, 375 So. 2d at 451 (citing Pickett, 192 So. 261).
262
370 So. 2d 947 (Ala. 1979).
263
Id. at 949 (first citing Slagle v. Reynolds Metals Co., 344 So. 2d 1216 (Ala. 1977); then citing
Pickett, 192 So. 261).
264
391 So. 2d 1016 (Ala. 1980).
265
Id. at 1020.
266
394 So. 2d 334 (Ala. 1980) (plurality opinion).
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hadn’t decided whether that was still true if those fellow employees were
supervisory employees and corporate officers.267 Fireman’s Fund resolved that
question: it held that Grantham’s section 13 analysis applied to all parties other
than the employer, including the workers’ comp carrier.268
The Fireman’s Fund plurality opinion didn’t have much analysis in it.269
But Justice Shores’s concurrence in the result was very influential and was
later adopted by the court.270 She believed that the vested-rights approach was
inadequate and should be abandoned: it was merely a type of ex post facto
clause, which provided insufficient protection for constitutional rights and was
moreover unnecessary in light of the Alabama Constitution’s explicit
prohibition of ex post facto laws.271 Grantham’s common-law rights approach
is better, even though it can lead to formalistic distinctions like Slagle v.
Parker’s distinction between common-law and statutory actions.272 Justice
Shores argued that when common-law rights are abolished, the abolition
should be held automatically suspect under section 13, but could be saved from
invalidity (1) if the right was “voluntarily relinquished . . . in exchange for
equivalent benefits or protection,” or (2) if the government is using its police
power to eradicate a perceived social evil.273 When non-common-law rights
(i.e., statutory rights) are abolished, the statute should be upheld if it’s
reasonable and nonarbitrary.274
The court adopted Justice Shores’s concurrence in Lankford v. Sullivan,
Long & Hagerty.275 This case involved a statute of limitations for products
liability cases.276 First, the court used Justice Shores’s two-part test for

267
Grantham v. Denke, 359 So. 2d 785 (Ala. 1978). The issue was raised but not decided in Jones v.
Watkins, 364 So. 2d 1144, 1146 (Ala. 1978), which suggested that maybe the answer might turn on what
function these officers and directors performed in the company.
268
Fireman’s Fund, 394 So. 2d at 336.
269
Justice Jones concurred in the result, repeating the reasoning of Grantham: The voluntary quid pro
quo theory only applies between employer and employee, and not between the employee and anyone else. It
doesn’t save the statute to argue that it helps people overall, in a collective sense—section 13’s protections are
individual, not collective. Id. at 341–43 (Jones, J., concurring in the result).
270
See Lankford v. Sullivan, Long & Hagerty, 416 So. 2d 996 (Ala. 1982).
271
ALA. CONST. art. I, § 22. But the court noted in Reed v. Brunson that this wasn’t true, as the ex post
facto clause only applies to criminal laws. 527 So. 2d 102, 114 n.5 (Ala. 1988).
272
See Fireman’s Fund, 394 So. 2d at 352 (Shores, J., concurring in the result).
273
Id.
274
See id. at 353.
275
416 So. 2d 996 (Ala. 1982).
276
Id. at 998–99.
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abrogations of common-law rights. Second, it used her test for abrogations of
non-common-law rights.277
On abrogations of common-law rights: (1) there’s no voluntary quid pro
quo here, so we look to (2) whether the statute eradicates a perceived social
evil.278 Here, the court examined the legislature’s reasons—without much
deference to the legislature’s judgment—and concluded that its rationale was
deficient.279 The legislature identified the evil of the increasing cost of
products liability actions and the effect of the increased cost on product prices
and the availability of insurance.280 But it’s unreasonable to think that a tenyear statute of limitations will have an effect on that; there’s no documentation
of the effect of the “long tail” (i.e., those cases that show up after ten years) or
the extent of the crisis in Alabama.281 Moreover, insurance rates are set
nationally, so individual state tort reforms can do little to affect the products
liability problem.282
On abrogations of non-common-law rights, Justice Shores’s standard is
more forgiving—only requiring that the statute not be arbitrary and capricious.
But here, too, the statute is arbitrary because it ties the limitations period to the
date of use, not the date of accrual of the action—it’s thus a statute of repose,
not a statute of limitations—and there’s no saving clause for injuries that occur
toward the end of the period.283
3. The Move Back to Confusion
After the Grantham–Fireman’s Fund–Lankford trilogy from 1978 to 1982,
then, one might have thought that the law was clear: The vested-rights
approach was out and Justice Shores’s common-law rights approach from
Fireman’s Fund was in, with the strict two-part test for abrogations of
common-law rights (plus a loose arbitrary and capricious test for abrogations
277
This is because the defendant argued that privity was required for products liability actions at
common law; no privity was present in this case. Therefore, this was actually a case of an abrogation of a noncommon-law right. The court noted that some such cases will have privity and others won’t, so just in case, it
did both analyses. Id. at 1000.
278
See id. at 1001.
279
Id. at 1001–03.
280
Id. at 1001.
281
Id.
282
Id. at 1002.
283
Id. at 1003–04; see also Phillips, supra note 166, at 1337 (noting that Justice Jones, in his Lankford
concurrence, 416 So. 2d at 1007 (Jones, J., concurring), would look not to whether a right derived from the
“common law” in a narrow sense, but to whether a right was “engrained into the fabric of the law [so] as to
acquire a fundamental and basic status” (alteration in original) (internal quotations marks omitted)).
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of non-common-law rights). Moreover, as Lankford showed, the court was
willing to apply this approach without deference to legislative judgment and
was even willing to apply the nominally loose arbitrary and capricious test in a
sort of strict way.
For a while, the cases were consistent with this view.284 But then came
Reed v. Brunson.285 In Reed, the court examined a statute preventing an
employee receiving workers’ comp from suing his fellow employees except
when there was willful conduct.286 After a lengthy discussion of the history of
the cases,287 the court applied both approaches—the vested-rights approach
and the common-law rights approach.
Under the vested-rights approach, the statute was valid because the
plaintiff’s injuries occurred after the statute become law.288 And under the
common-law rights approach: (1) There was mutuality because the employee
giving up the right to others gets the corresponding benefit that others won’t
sue him.289 And (2) on the eradication of a social evil, the court deferred to the
legislature’s judgment (as expressed in the lengthy findings included in the
statute).290
Reed is a weird case because (1) it seems to be more deferential to the
legislature than previous cases like Lankford, and, more importantly, (2) even
though it seemed like the vested-rights approach was gone, the opinion still did
the vested-rights analysis (just in case?).
Shortly after Reed, the court looked at a workers’ comp provision
preventing a father from suing for his son’s wrongful death. In Yarchak v.
284
See Barlow v. Humana, Inc., 495 So. 2d 1048 (Ala. 1986); Jackson v. Mannesmann Demag Corp.,
435 So. 2d 725 (Ala. 1983); see also Home Indem. Co. v. Anders, 459 So. 2d 836, 840–41 (Ala. 1984)
(upholding a statute limiting municipal liability, based on municipal liability-specific analysis); Scott v. Dunn,
419 So. 2d 1340, 1345–46 (Ala. 1982) (upholding a statute that provided that there would be no liability for
damage caused by cows to cars, based on a cow-specific analysis).
285
527 So. 2d 102 (Ala. 1988).
286
Id. at 113–14.
287
Id. at 107–12.
288
Id. at 114.
289
Id. at 115 & n.7. Was this correct? As in Grantham, the court relied on the theory that choosing
workers’ comp was voluntary. See id. at 109, 115; see also Grantham v. Denke, 359 So. 2d 785, 787 (Ala.
1978). But, as Justice Jones, concurring in the result, pointed out, the voluntary nature of workers’ comp was
by no means clear after the 1973 amendments. See Reed, 527 So. 2d at 121–22 (Jones, J., concurring in the
result); see also Ford & Abernathy, supra note 23, at 51. Justice Jones himself would have found mutuality
even without voluntary election—unlike the similar statute struck down in Grantham, this statute also gave the
employee other benefits, like increased benefits, a longer statute of limitations, and preservation of the cause of
action for willful injury. See Reed, 527 So. 2d at 121–22 (Jones, J., concurring in the result).
290
Reed, 527 So. 2d at 116.
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Munford, Inc., the father argued that a wrongful death action was common-law
in nature, so abolishing it in his case required the strict two-prong test, but the
court disagreed, saying that wrongful death was statutory in nature.291 Recall
that, in 1979, in Slagle v. Parker, the court had upheld an abolition of wrongful
death actions against coworkers in the workers’ comp context, reasoning that
since wrongful death actions were statutory in nature, the legislature could
abrogate them as long as it didn’t touch vested rights (citing Pickett).292 The
Yarchak court upheld this statute too, but not on a vested-rights theory
(although it briefly mentioned that a vested-rights approach had been applied
in Reed). Since it was an abrogation of a non-common-law right, all that was
required (under Lankford) was that the statute not be arbitrary and capricious,
and indeed that’s what the court found.293
The Yarchak court’s failure to rely on vested rights suggested that maybe
Reed might have been a fluke—perhaps vested rights were clearly out the
window after all. But several later cases continued to use the Reed approach of
looking to vested rights just in case. For instance, in Murdock v. Steel
Processing Services, Inc., the court again looked at the exclusivity provisions
of the workers’ comp law—this time the provision barring the non-workers’comp rights and remedies of the worker’s spouse.294 The court held that this
was valid under both the vested-rights approach and the common-law rights
approach.295 The analysis under the common-law rights approach was very
deferential to the legislative judgment of treating the husband and wife as a
single entity for workers’ comp purposes.296
Kruszewski v. Liberty Mutual Insurance was along the same lines.297 Here,
the issue was the validity of the immunity of the workers’ comp insurance
carrier.298 (Reed had upheld the immunity of co-employees.) The court applied
both the vested-rights approach and the common-law rights approach, again
being extremely deferential to the legislature’s judgment.299 Indeed, there was
virtually no analysis here.

291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299

570 So. 2d 648 (Ala. 1990).
370 So. 2d 947, 949–50 (Ala. 1979) (citing Pickett v. Matthews, 192 So. 261 (1939).
Yarchak, 570 So. 2d at 649–50.
581 So. 2d 846 (Ala. 1991).
Id. at 848.
Id.
653 So. 2d 935 (Ala. 1995).
See id. at 937.
See id. at 937–38.
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The court continued to nod in the direction of vested rights in the following
years.300 And in Baugher v. Beaver Construction Co., the court looked at a
construction industry statute of repose, like the one invalidated in Lankford.301
The Baugher court said that, in the past, the court had applied both the vestedrights approach and the common-law rights approach, and it then upheld the
statute under both approaches, deferring to the legislature (and citing its
lengthy findings in the statute) on whether this was a valid exercise of the
police power to eradicate a perceived social evil.302 Also, it helped that there
was a saving clause for those who were injured near the end of the statutory
period.303 Baugher was the Supreme Court of Alabama’s last significant
statement on this issue.
For purposes of the med-mal administrative compensation scheme, it
would be prudent to assume that both the vested-rights approach and the
common-law rights approach are still the law. The vested-rights approach
should be easy to satisfy: the Alabama bill explicitly provides that it operates
only prospectively.304 As for the common-law rights approach, some cases
have been deferential to the legislature’s judgment—but not all, so the
legislature ought to include detailed findings in the law justifying why it’s
necessary for the state to use its police power to remedy the perceived social
evil of common-law medical malpractice litigation. However, some sections—
like the statute of repose,305 the departure from the collateral-source rule,306
and the maximum contribution and payout amounts307—might pose some
problems in the event that the court chooses to treat the legislature’s judgment
with less deference and scrutinizes the relationship between the perceived
social evil and the legislature’s exercise of its police power.

300
See, e.g., United Cos. Lending Corp. v. Autrey, 723 So. 2d 617 (Ala. 1998); McCullar v. Universal
Underwriters Life Ins., 687 So. 2d 156 (Ala. 1996) (plurality opinion); Morris v. Merritt Oil Co., 686 So. 2d
1139 (Ala. 1996).
301
791 So. 2d 932 (Ala. 2000).
302
Id. at 934–37.
303
Id. at 937.
304
S. 413, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 12(a) (Ala. 2016).
305
Id. § 5(c); see also supra text accompanying notes 283, 301–03 (discussing treatment of statutes of
repose and relevance of savings clauses for people injured near the end of the statutory period).
306
Ala. S. 413 § 6(f); see also Hubbard, supra note 1, at 485–88; infra note 396 (discussing back-andforth on collateral-source rule in Alabama cases under equal protection).
307
Ala. S. 413 § 8; see also supra text accompanying notes 118–19, 124; infra text accompanying notes
387–96 (discussing Alabama case law on caps under jury trial and equal protection).
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V. DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION
Finally, any statute can be challenged under concepts of due process and
equal protection. Under the Federal Constitution, fiddling with the tort system
is an example of economic regulation, which is analyzed under the very
deferential rational basis test.308 And the same is true in Georgia, Florida, and
Alabama, although one can occasionally find courts being unexpectedly strict,
applying “rational basis with bite.”309 Courts often don’t clearly distinguish
between due process and equal protection—there generally isn’t much need to
do so since both doctrines have the same rational basis standard—which is
why it makes sense to consider the doctrines together here. The equal
protection law is in a state of confusion in Alabama, where there doesn’t even
seem to be any consensus as to whether equal protection exists under the state
constitution at all.
A. The Federal Clauses
The Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the New York
workers’ compensation law under the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses in New York Central Railroad v. White.310 The challengers argued
(a) that the employer’s property is taken without due process of
law, because he is subjected to a liability for compensation
without regard to any neglect or default on his part or on the
part of any other person for whom he is responsible, and in
spite of the fact that the injury may be solely attributable to
the fault of the employee;
(b) that the employee’s rights are interfered with, in that he is
prevented from having compensation for injuries arising from
the employer’s fault commensurate with the damages actually
sustained, and is limited to the measure of compensation
prescribed by the act; and
(c) that both employer and employee are deprived of their liberty
to acquire property by being prevented from making such

308
See, e.g., Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949) (upholding, under the Equal
Protection Clause, “classification[s that] ha[ve] relation to the purpose for which [they are] made”); W. Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937) (stating that “regulation which is reasonable in relation to its
subject and is adopted in the interests of the community is due process”).
309
See, e.g., Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any Other
Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779 (1987); cf. Duff, supra note 26, at 177–84 (discussing state equal protection theories);
Maron, supra note 31, at 125–35 (discussing due process and equal protection under Mississippi con law).
310
243 U.S. 188 (1917).
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agreement as they choose respecting the terms of the
employment.311

The Supreme Court rejected these claims:
No person has a vested interest in any rule of law entitling him to
insist that it shall remain unchanged for his benefit. The common law
bases the employer’s liability for injuries to the employee upon the
ground of negligence; but negligence is merely the disregard of some
duty imposed by law; and the nature and extent of the duty may be
modified by legislation, with corresponding change in the test of
negligence. Indeed, liability may be imposed for the consequences of
a failure to comply with a statutory duty, irrespective of negligence
in the ordinary sense . . . .312

“It may be added, by way of reminder, that the entire matter of liability for
death caused by wrongful act . . . is a modern statutory innovation, in which
the [s]tates differ as to who may sue, for whose benefit, and the measure of
damages.”313
The Court found it unnecessary to decide whether “a [s]tate might, without
violence to the constitutional guaranty of ‘due process of law,’ suddenly set
aside all common-law rules respecting liability as between employer and
employee, without providing a reasonably just substitute.”314 In light of
employers’ and employees’ substantial reliance interests in the current state of
the law, “it perhaps may be doubted whether the [s]tate could abolish all rights
of action, on the one hand, or all defenses on the other, without setting up
something adequate in their stead”—although this is of course dictum.315
Instead, the Court observed that the New York act embodied a quid pro quo:
Employees recovered less money, but they recovered in more cases, and more
quickly and certainly.316 Employers, for their part, lost defenses, but acquired
greater certainty in damages.317

311

Id. at 196–97 (paragraph breaks added).
Id. at 198 (citations omitted) (first citing Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876); then citing
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 532 (1884); then citing Martin v. Pittsburg & Lake Erie R.R., 203 U.S.
284, 294 (1906); then citing Mondou v. N.Y., New Haven, & Hartford R.R. (Second Employers’ Liability
Cases), 223 U.S. 1, 50 (1912); and then citing Chi. & Alton R.R. v. Tranbarger, 238 U.S. 67, 76 (1915)).
313
Id. at 200.
314
Id. at 201.
315
Id.
316
See id.; see also Ford & Abernathy, supra note 24, at 51.
317
See White, 243 U.S. at 201; Zomberg, supra note 178, at 829, 851–52; see also supra text
accompanying notes 24–28.
312
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The Court went on to conclude, based on the details, that the “new
arrangement” was not “arbitrary and unreasonable, from the standpoint of
natural justice”318:
This, of course, is not to say that any scale of compensation,
however insignificant on the one hand or onerous on the other, would
be supportable. In this case, no criticism is made on the ground that
the compensation prescribed by the statute in question is
unreasonable in amount, either in general or in the particular case.
Any question of that kind may be met when it arises.319

The Court also held that, although the statute abridged freedom of contract,
this was acceptable because—having to do with loss of life and limb in
hazardous occupations—it was “a reasonable exercise of the police power of
the [s]tate.”320 It further held that the procedural provisions of the statute,
including the denial of a jury, comported with due process.321
The equal protection argument was that farm laborers and domestic
servants were improperly excluded, but this discrimination was upheld as
nonarbitrary, “since it reasonably may be considered that the risks inherent in
these occupations are exceptionally patent, simple, and familiar.”322
The reasoning in White would probably apply to a med-mal administrative
compensation scheme as well. States are allowed to modify their common law;
under this system, injured patients give up their right to sue in a common-law
court but obtain some compensation in a greater set of cases, doctors gain
predictability, and hopefully litigation costs will be lower. Admittedly, this
scheme deals with medical injuries generally and not just hazardous
employment as in White, but the White court would probably still consider this
a reasonable exercise of the police power.323

318
White, 243 U.S. at 202; see also id. at 203 (“It is plain that, on grounds of natural justice, it is not
unreasonable . . . .”).
319
Id. at 205–06.
320
Id. at 206.
321
Id. at 207–08 (first citing Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1875); then citing Frank v. Magnum, 237
U.S. 309, 340 (1915)).
322
Id. at 208 (citing Mo., Kan., & Tex. Ry. v. Cade, 233 U.S. 642, 650 (1914)).
323
See also Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 122–24 (1929) (upholding a Connecticut statute preventing
guests in a car from recovering for the owner’s or operator’s negligence against due process and equal
protection challenges); Ariz. Employers’ Liab. Cases, 250 U.S. 400, 420–31 (1919) (upholding an Arizona
statute providing for no-fault employer liability in workplace injuries against due process and equal protection
challenges).
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Moreover, all this assumes that a med-mal administrative system would be
judged on same terms as the New York statute evaluated in White. But White
was decided a century ago, and modern doctrine is much more deferential to
the legislature than it was in 1917. White applied due process doctrine from the
Lochner era, which (since the New Deal) is no longer good law.324 Under
modern doctrine, all that’s required to uphold the system against a due process
challenge is the traditional rational basis test that is standard in the analysis of
economic regulation.325 And a rational basis is easy to find here: a rational
legislature could have thought that the medical malpractice system was
dysfunctional and that an administrative system would work better.326 It’s
doubtful that a quid pro quo is required327—although this is an issue that the
Supreme Court hasn’t definitely resolved,328 so showing that the law does
provide some sort of substitute can’t hurt.329
So far we’ve been talking about substantive due process, but as a matter of
procedural due process the matter is clearer yet: even assuming that a right to
sue is a species of “property” and therefore can’t be eliminated without due

324
See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 861–62 (1992) (discussing the demise of the
Lochner line of cases beginning in 1937).
325
See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 82–84 (1978) (rejecting the
suggestion, in a case about liability limitations for nuclear power plants, that “the traditional presumption of
constitutionality generally accorded economic regulations” be replaced by a heightened standard); Duff, supra
note 26, at 133 (“[I]t might be argued that workers’ compensation laws are tantamount to ‘ordinary’ common
law rules, modifiable at will by a rational legislature.”); id. at 136 (“If none of White remains viable, it may be
a short road to judicial authorization of any legislative reduction of personal injury remedies . . . .”).
326
Cf. Zomberg, supra note 178, at 829 (discussing the Kansas Supreme Court’s upholding of workers’
compensation amendments as satisfying the rational basis standard); id. at 838 (noting that the due process
analysis in Kansas is a two-part test that resembles Florida’s Kluger access to courts doctrine); id. at 842
(explaining that the first part of the Kansas two-part test, which resembles federal rational basis, also
resembles the Kansas rational basis test under equal protection); id. at 845–47 (discussing the Kansas Supreme
Court’s rejection, under the rational basis test, of the equal protection argument against the workers’
compensation amendments).
327
See Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 88 (“[I]t is not at all clear that the Due Process Clause in fact requires
that a legislatively enacted compensation scheme either duplicate the recovery at common law or provide a
reasonable substitute remedy.”); id. at 88 n.32 (“[S]tatutes limiting liability are relatively commonplace and
have consistently been enforced by the courts.” (citing cases)).
328
See Fein v. Permanente Med. Grp., 474 U.S. 892, 894–95 (1985) (White, J., dissenting) (“Whether
due process requires a legislatively enacted compensation scheme to be a quid pro quo for the common-law or
state-law remedy it replaces, and if so, how adequate it must be, thus appears to be an issue unresolved by this
Court, and one which is dividing the appellate and highest courts of several [s]tates.”); Duff, supra note 26, at
187–89.
329
See Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 88–93 (not reaching the question of whether a “reasonably just
substitute” for displaced tort remedies is necessary because the statute at issue did provide a substitute).
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process of law, “the legislative determination provides all the process that is
due.”330
On the equal protection claim, whether someone is a doctor or patient isn’t
a suspect classification, and the right to have a traditional common-law cause
of action has never been held to be a “fundamental right.” Therefore, here, too,
merely rational basis is required. Any equal protection objection to the
limitation of the administrative scheme to med-mal cases is insubstantial.
B. Georgia Due Process and Equal Protection
In Georgia, arguments based on the state’s due process and equal
protection clauses331 were raised in the context of the employer immunity in
the workers’ compensation act and rejected in Georgia Department of Human
Resources v. Joseph Campbell Co.332 The Joseph Campbell opinion didn’t
contain any reasoning, but it did cite Henderson v. Hercules, Inc.333 and
Williams v. Byrd.334 Henderson didn’t even purport to rely on the due process
or equal protection clauses.335 Williams rejected the constitutional challenge to
the extinguishment of an employee’s action for negligence against a fellow
employee.336
Neither opinion contained much reasoning. Williams simply stated that the
statute “is not unconstitutional for any reason alleged by appellants. No case to
the contrary has been cited or found.”337 Nonetheless, Joseph Campbell and
Williams together upheld many key provisions of the workers’ compensation
act against due process and equal protection challenges. This strongly suggests
that a med-mal administrative scheme would fare similarly.338 This is true
330
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 433 (1982); Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of
Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445–46 (1915).
331
See GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. I (“No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property except by
due process of law.”); id. para. II (“No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws.”).
332
411 S.E.2d 871, 873 (Ga. 1992).
333
324 S.E.2d 453 (Ga. 1985).
334
247 S.E.2d 874 (Ga. 1978).
335
324 S.E.2d at 454 (analyzing the statute under GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. XXIV (1976) (“All
property of the wife at the time of her marriage, and all property given to, inherited or acquired by her, shall
remain her separate property, and not be liable for the debts of her husband.”)).
336
247 S.E.2d at 875.
337
Id. (citation omitted) (citing 2A Arthur LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION § 72.20
(1976)).
338
Cf. Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Conkle, 436 S.E.2d 635, 637–39 (Ga. 1993) (rejecting an equal protection
challenge to a statute diverting 75% of punitive damages awards in products liability cases to the state); id. at
640 (rejecting a due process challenge to the same statute); Teasley v. Mathis, 255 S.E.2d 57, 58 (Ga. 1979)
(rejecting a due process and equal protection challenge to the provision of the Georgia Motor Vehicle Accident
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regardless of how medical malpractice claims were treated when the
constitution was adopted, which is relevant for the jury trial right but not for
due process or equal protection.339
C. Florida Due Process and Equal Protection
To survive a state due process challenge340 (which, like equal protection,
functions similarly to its federal counterpart),341 the statute must “bear[] a
reasonable relation to a permissible legislative objective and [not be]
discriminatory, arbitrary or oppressive.”342 The Lasky v. State Farm Insurance
court found that lessening court congestion, reducing insurance premiums, and
increasing the likelihood of compensation for victims, as well as fixing
complaints about the tort system’s slowness, inefficiency, and inequalities of
recovery, were permissible legislative objectives.343 The court’s discussion of
whether the statute was reasonably related to these objectives was fairly
deferential.344
The court likewise upheld the partial abrogation of joint and several
liability in Smith v. Department of Insurance because there was a rational basis
for the abrogation as well as for the exceptions.345 In fact, due process review
is so deferential that it would be tedious to discuss all the cases upholding

Reparation Act barring recovery of exemplary damages by accident victims without serious injuries); Cannon
v. Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins., 241 S.E.2d 238, 240–41 (Ga. 1978) (rejecting a due process and equal
protection challenge to the provision of the Georgia Motor Vehicle Accident Reparation Act limiting survivor
benefits to certain types of people); Williams v. Kennedy, 240 S.E.2d 51, 53 (Ga. 1977) (rejecting a due
process and equal protection challenge to the provision of the Georgia Motor Vehicle Accident Reparation Act
barring recovery of noneconomic damages by accident victims without serious injuries); Andrew v. State, 233
S.E.2d 209 (Ga. 1977) (rejecting a due process challenge to the mandatory insurance provision of the Georgia
Motor Vehicle Accident Reparation Act).
339
However, occasionally Georgia courts have applied equal protection fairly stringently, for instance in
the case of statutes of repose. See, e.g., Shessel v. Stroup, 316 S.E.2d 155 (Ga. 1984) (striking down a medmal statute of repose on equal protection grounds); Clark v. Singer, 298 S.E.2d 484 (Ga. 1983) (same). For the
distinction between statutes of limitations and statutes of repose, see infra text accompanying notes 283, 301–
03.
340
See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9 (“No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law, or be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense, or be compelled in any criminal matter to be a
witness against oneself.”).
341
See, e.g., Sasso v. Ram Prop. Mgmt., 431 So. 2d 204, 212 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (citing Schreiner
v. McKenzie Tank Lines & Risk Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 408 So. 2d 711, 716 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982), aff’d, 432
So. 2d 567 (Fla. 1983)).
342
Lasky v. State Farm Ins., 296 So. 2d 9, 15 (Fla. 1974) (first citing Harrell v. Schleman, 36 So. 2d 431
(Fla. 1948); then citing Adams. v. Am. Agric. Chem. Co., 82 So. 850 (Fla. 1919)).
343
Id. at 16.
344
See id. at 16–17.
345
507 So. 2d 1080, 1091 (Fla. 1987).
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various statutes under due process.346 What’s more interesting is the cases in
which courts have said due process was violated.347
In Aldana v. Holub, a statute imposing strict and mandatory time limits in
medical mediation proceedings was held to violate due process because
litigants could be deprived of valuable legal rights simply due to unavoidable
delays in the legal system.348
In Psychiatric Associates v. Siegel, the Florida Supreme Court considered
the validity of statutes requiring “a plaintiff bringing an action against someone
who participated in a medical review board process to post a bond sufficient to
cover the defendant’s costs and attorney’s fees.”349 We’ve seen this case
before350: the statutes were struck down under Kluger prong two because they
burdened access to courts and it hadn’t been shown that there was no other
alternative.351 But the court also held that these statutes violated due process
because, in trying to discourage frivolous claims by doctors against medical
review boards, they disproportionately affected poor claimants who couldn’t
afford the bond.352

346
In the workers’ comp context, see Newton v. McCotter Motors, Inc., 475 So. 2d 230, 231 (Fla. 1985);
Scholastic Sys., Inc. v. LeLoup, 307 So. 2d 166, 170 (Fla. 1974); Lundy v. Four Seasons Ocean Grand Palm
Beach, 932 So. 2d 506, 510 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006), disapproved on other grounds by Murray v. Mariner
Health, 994 So. 2d 1051, 1061 (Fla. 2008); Rucker v. City of Ocala, 684 So. 2d 836, 840–42 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1996); Strohm v. Hertz Corp./Hertz Claim Mgmt., 685 So. 2d 37, 39–40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996);
Bradley v. Hurricane Rest., 670 So. 2d 162, 165 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Burdick v. Bob’s Space Racers,
659 So. 2d 351, 352 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Montgomery Ward v. Lovell, 652 So. 2d 509, 512 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1995); Rodriguez v. Prestress Decking Corp., 611 So. 2d 59, 60 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Whitely v.
U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 454 So. 2d 63, 65 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Carr v. Cent. Fla. Aluminum Prods., Inc.,
402 So. 2d 565, 568 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); see also Castellanos v. Next Door Co./Amerisure Ins., 124 So.
3d 392, 394 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013), quashed by 192 So. 3d 431 (Fla. 2016); Kauffman v. Cmty. Inclusions,
Inc./Guarantee Ins., 57 So. 3d 919, 920–21 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011); Campbell v. Aramark & Speciality Risk
Servs., 933 So. 2d 1255, 1256 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006), disapproved on other grounds by Murray v. Mariner
Health, 994 So. 2d 1051, 1062 (Fla. 2008). In related contexts, see Chrysler Corp. v. Pitsirelos, 721 So. 2d
710, 713–14 (Fla. 1998) (holding that mandatory arbitration under lemon law with the possibility of de novo
court review satisfies access to courts; the continuing damages provision also satisfies access to courts because
damages are meant to compensate consumer); Florida Patient’s Comp. Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145, 1148–
49 (Fla. 1985) (upholding loser-pays for med-mal).
347
Of course, every due process case turns on its own facts, and the cases are highly varied, so it’s hard
to say anything for sure, but I haven’t been able to find a case ruling against something similar to the proposed
med-mal administrative system on due process grounds.
348
381 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1980).
349
610 So. 2d 419, 421 (Fla. 1992).
350
See supra text accompanying notes 222–26.
351
Siegel, 610 So. 2d at 424–25.
352
Id. at 425–26.
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In Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance v. Pinnacle Medical, Inc., the court
considered the validity of an attorney’s-fee-shifting statute.353 Under the
statute, if an insured sued an insurer to enforce his insurance contract, he
wasn’t liable for the insurer’s attorney’s fees if he lost—but if a medical
provider that had been assigned the insured’s claim did the same, it was liable
for the insurer’s attorney’s fees.354 The court held that:
This distinction does nothing to further the prompt payment of
benefits or to discourage insurers’ denial of valid claims. The effect
of the attorney-fee provision . . . is to further delay insureds from
receiving medical benefits by encouraging medical providers to
require payment from insureds at the time the services are rendered
rather than risk having to collect through arbitration. Thus, the
prevailing party attorney-fee provision . . . arbitrarily distinguishes
between medical providers and insureds, violating medical providers’
due process rights . . . .355

The med-mal administrative system doesn’t resemble these cases much;
moreover, the workers’ comp program, its closest analogue, has successfully
sustained due process attacks.
Now let’s consider the equal protection clause.356 To survive a state equal
protection challenge, a “statutory classification[] must be reasonable and
nonarbitrary, and all persons in the same class must be treated alike. When the
difference between those included in a class and those excluded from it bears a
substantial relationship to the legislative purpose, the classification does not
deny equal protection.”357
This is also a deferential standard. A plurality opinion of the Florida
Supreme Court was recently nondeferential in examining the legislative
findings supporting a cap on noneconomic damages, essentially disbelieving
the legislature on the existence of the supposed medical insurance crisis

353

753 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 2000).
Id. at 57.
355
Id. at 59.
356
See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2 (“All natural persons . . . are equal before the law and have inalienable
rights . . . .”).
357
Lasky v. State Farm Ins., 296 So. 2d 9, 18 (Fla. 1974) (citations omitted) (first citing Silver Blue
Lake Apartments, Inc. v. Silver Blue Lake Home Owners Ass’n, 225 So. 2d 557 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969);
then citing Daniels v. O’Connor, 243 So. 2d 144 (Fla. 1971)); see id. at 19 (citing Silver Blue Lake
Apartments, 225 So. 2d 557 and Daniels, 243 So. 2d 144); Estate of McCall v. United States, 134 So. 3d 894,
901 (Fla. 2014) (plurality opinion) (stating that a cap on noneconomic damages is evaluated under the rational
basis test).
354
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supporting the cap.358 But that plurality opinion represents the views of only
two out of seven justices: Justices Lewis and Labarga.359
Thus, in Mizrahi v. North Miami Medical Center, Ltd., the court considered
whether the Wrongful Death Act—which for the first time authorized the
recovery of nonpecuniary damages for wrongful death by adult children—
could, consistent with equal protection, make an exception to this new rule
when the wrongful death was caused by med-mal.360 The court concluded that
this legislative choice was rational (and therefore consistent with equal
protection) because it bore “a rational relationship to the legitimate state
interests of limiting increases in medical insurance costs.”361
As with due process, most cases uphold the classifications;362 let’s look at
cases where they’ve been struck down.

358
See McCall, 134 So. 3d at 905–12 (plurality opinion) (reexamining the factual bases of the statute);
see also supra text accompanying note 235.
359
Compare id., with id. at 921–22 (Pariente, J., concurring in the result) (disapproving of this
reexamination), and id. at 931–32 (Polston, C.J., dissenting).
360
761 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. 2000).
361
Id. at 1042 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Stewart v. Price, 718 So. 2d 205, 210 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1998)).
362
In the workers’ comp context, see Newton v. McCotter Motors, Inc., 475 So. 2d 230, 231 (Fla. 1985);
Sasso v. Ram Prop. Mgmt., 452 So. 2d 932, 934 & n.3 (Fla. 1984); Acton v. Fort Lauderdale Hosp., 440 So.
2d 1282, 1284 (Fla. 1983); Lundy v. Four Seasons Ocean Grand Palm Beach, 932 So. 2d 506, 510 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2006), disapproved on other grounds by Murray v. Mariner Health, 994 So. 2d 1051, 1062 (Fla.
2008); Bradley v. Hurricane Rest., 670 So. 2d 162, 165 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Strohm v. Hertz
Corp./Hertz Claim Mgmt., 685 So. 2d 37, 39–40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Rodriguez v. Prestress Decking
Corp., 611 So. 2d 59 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Whitely v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 454 So. 2d 63, 65 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1984); Morrow v. Amcon Concrete, Inc., 433 So. 2d 1230, 1232 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Radney
v. Edwards, 424 So. 2d 956, 957 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Noel v. M. Ecker & Co., 422 So. 2d 1062, 1063
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); see also Castellanos v. Next Door Co./Amerisure Ins., 124 So. 3d 392 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2013), quashed by 192 So. 3d 431, 449 (Fla. 2016); Kauffman v. Cmty. Inclusions, Inc./Guarantee Ins.,
57 So. 3d 919, 920–21 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011); Campbell v. Aramark & Speciality Risk Servs., 933 So. 2d
1255, 1256 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006), disapproved on other grounds by Murray v. Mariner Health, 994 So. 2d
1051, 1062 (Fla. 2008). In related contexts, see Samples v. Fla. Birth-Related Neurological Injury Comp.
Ass’n, 114 So. 3d 912, 917 (Fla. 2013) (upholding the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury
Compensation Plan against a claim that a parental award should have been $100,000 per parent as opposed to
per claim); Smith v. Dep’t of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1090 (Fla. 1987) (upholding a partial abrogation of joint
and several liability); Fla. Patient’s Comp. Fund v. Von Stetina, 474 So. 2d 783, 789 (Fla. 1985) (upholding
the legislature’s power to create a nonprofit fund to provide medical insurance and be responsible for portions
of awards in excess of $100,000 per year, up to a maximum of $100,000 per year, and holding that this didn’t
implicate any suspect classification and was rational); Fla. Patient’s Comp. Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145,
1149 (Fla. 1985) (upholding loser-pays for med-mal); see also Gluesenkamp v. State, 391 So. 2d 192, 199–200
(Fla. 1980) (distinguishing between passenger vehicles and other vehicles for the purposes of granting officials
access for inspection is a rational distinction).
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Consider Lasky v. State Farm Insurance, which upheld an auto accident
liability and insurance statute—and which we’ve already seen in connection
with both the jury trial right and the access to court right.363 There, the court
examined the classifications surrounding the pain and suffering thresholds:
pain and suffering damages were unavailable unless there was at least $1,000
in medical benefits, a permanent injury or death occurred, or certain listed
injuries (such as fractures of weight-bearing bones or compound fractures)
were present.364 The court upheld the basic $1,000 threshold and the
permanent-injury-or-death threshold.365 But it struck down the weight-bearing
or compound-fracture threshold since, for cases in which medical costs are
below $1,000 and there’s no death or permanent injury, it makes no sense to
allow pain and suffering damages for an injury to the weight-bearing bones in
one’s little toe but to deny them for a skull injury.366
A few aspects of the workers’ comp statute have been struck down under
equal protection, but these weren’t in the core of workers’ comp. In Sunspan
Engineering & Construction Co. v. Spring-Lock Scaffolding Co., the court
considered employers’ immunity from suit.367 Sure, employers are immune
from suit by their employees because their employees have workers’ comp to
fall back on. But what if the employee also sues a third-party tortfeasor, and
the third-party tortfeasor wants to sue the employer, arguing that the employer
is partly or entirely liable? The court held that the employer’s immunity didn’t
apply in these cases; denying third-party tortfeasors the right to sue the
employer was arbitrary and violated equal protection.368 (Clearly, this has no
applicability to the immunity of the employer from employee suits.)369
When a statute is ambiguous, and when one possible interpretation would
be possibly unconstitutional, these constitutional concerns sometimes lead
courts to choose the interpretation that doesn’t raise constitutional problems.370

363

296 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974); see also supra text accompanying notes 103–06, 202–05.
Lasky, 296 So. 2d at 20.
365
Id.
366
Id. at 20–21.
367
310 So. 2d 4, 8 (Fla. 1975); see supra notes 186, 216.
368
Sunspan, 310 So. 2d at 8.
369
See also De Ayala v. Fla. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins., 543 So. 2d 204, 207–08 (Fla. 1989) (striking down
a workers’ comp provision because of discriminatory treatment of nonresident alien dependents). For other
cases finding equal protection violations but in contexts not closely related to med-mal or administrative
tribunals, see, for example, Rollins v. State, 354 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 1978).
370
See, e.g., JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND REGULATION: CASES
AND MATERIALS 331–53 (3d ed. 2017) (discussing the constitutional avoidance canon).
364
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So courts have sometimes used constitutional concerns to guide their statutory
interpretation rather than strike a statute down.371
Quite recently, in Estate of McCall v. United States, a majority of the
Florida Supreme Court (five justices of seven) held that, in the case of a clearly
per-incident cap on noneconomic damages in a wrongful death case arising
from med-mal, the per-incident limitation was “arbitrary and unrelated to a
true state interest.”372
But just the year before McCall, in Samples v. Florida Birth-Related
Neurological Injury Compensation Ass’n—discussed above, in the access-tocourts section373—the court wrote that while this was a concern under a faultbased system, it was no longer problematic under a no-fault system like the
one at issue there, the Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan.374
The McCall court specifically noted that the fault–no-fault distinction was
crucial, and that Samples remained good law: the traditional fault-based
negligence action and the statutorily created no-fault scheme “are, quite
simply, completely different and distinct”; the result under Samples didn’t
“control, or even inform,” the outcome in McCall.375
In the case of the med-mal administrative system, the distinction that one
might want to challenge under equal protection would seem to be the one
between medical-malpractice injuries (which go to the administrative system)
and injuries arising outside of medical malpractice (which stay in the tort
system). But it seems clear that this is a rational distinction that can be
supported by findings specific to medical malpractice. The court seems
unlikely to apply heightened scrutiny to the policy considerations underlying
the statute, since the discussion in McCall only represented the views of two
justices. As for various details of the compensation scheme that might be
challenged as irrational: to be on the safe side and fall on the more generous
side of the distinction between fault-based and no-fault systems, it would help

371
See St. Mary’s Hosp., Inc. v. Phillipe, 769 So. 2d 961, 971 (Fla. 2000), superseded by statute, FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 766.207 (West 2003), as recognized in Lifemark Hosps. v. Afonso, 4 So. 3d 764 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2009); Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 1976); Trindade v. Abbey Rd. Beef ’N Booze, 443 So.
2d 1007, 1012 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
372
134 So. 3d 894, 901 (Fla. 2014) (plurality opinion); see also id. at 919–20 (Pariente, J., concurring in
result); Duff, supra note 26, at 182–84.
373
See supra text accompanying notes 213–14.
374
114 So. 3d 912, 919 (Fla. 2013).
375
McCall, 134 So. 3d at 904 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 921–22 (Pariente, J., concurring in
result) (explaining that the disagreement with the plurality opinion related only to its second-guessing of the
legislature’s faculty findings).
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for the standard of liability under the administrative system to be as distant
from a fault-based system as possible.376
D. Alabama Due Process and Equal Protection
The Alabama Constitution doesn’t have a due process clause or equal
protection clause in the same way that the U.S. Constitution does. There is a
due process clause, but it’s by its terms limited to criminal cases: “That in all
criminal prosecutions, the accused . . . shall not . . . be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, except by due process of law . . . .”377 The right-to-a-remedy
clause provides that “every person, for any injury done him, . . . shall have a
remedy by due process of law,”378 but that clause has already been analyzed
above.
And there’s no equal protection clause at all—not surprising, since one of
the explicit goals of the 1901 constitution was to establish white supremacy.379
Still, the Supreme Court of Alabama has often stated that equal protection
guarantees can be inferred from article I, sections 1, 6, and 22.380 Article I,
section 1 is a general declaration that “all men are equally free and
independent”;381 section 6 contains a bunch of criminal-defendant protections
including the due process clause noted above;382 and section 22 is a clause
prohibiting ex post facto laws, “irrevocable or exclusive grants of special
privileges or immunities,” and the like.383
So even though it’s hard to find exact equivalents to the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses in the Alabama Constitution, usually Alabama courts
talk as though due process and equal protection function more or less the same
way under the Alabama Constitution as under the U.S. Constitution. Usually,
government action under due process or equal protection is judged under the

376
As discussed above, see text accompanying supra note 237, when courts are nondeferential, they
might be inclined to eventually find that a crisis that once justified a particular system is now past. So the
recitation of legislative findings should include concerns that go beyond a particular temporary crisis.
377
ALA. CONST. art. I, § 6.
378
Id. art. I, § 13.
379
See Ex parte Melof, 735 So. 2d 1172, 1202 (Ala. 1999) (Cook, J., concurring in the result, dissenting
from the rationale) (citing the 1901 constitutional convention proceedings).
380
See id. at 1183–86 (majority opinion).
381
ALA. CONST. art. I, § 1.
382
Id. § 6.
383
Id. § 22.
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rational basis standard.384 Usually, the only exceptions—when any higher level
of review is applied—have been when fundamental rights or suspect
classifications are involved.385 Heightened scrutiny is thus usually unlikely for
“tort reform” measures. But note the “usually”: there are notable exceptions,
which are discussed below.
For a long time, this described the state of the doctrine in Alabama.386
Then, in 1991, came Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass’n.387 The statute at issue
in Moore limited noneconomic damages (including punitive damages) to
$400,000.388 The equal protection analysis sounds superficially like the rational
basis analysis, but it’s really “rational basis with bite,” in which a court
analyzes the rationality of a policy more strictly and without deference to the
legislature.
The legislature, said the court, can’t “create classifications ‘to prevent evils
of a remote or highly problematical character. Nor may its exercise be justified
when the restraint imposed upon the exercise of a private right is
disproportionate to the amount of evil that will be corrected.’”389 The statute
was irrational and thus violated equal protection: it classified victims based on
the severity of their injury (those least injured would fall under the cap and
would be unaffected, while those with large injuries would be bound by the
cap), and it also treats the most egregious health-care injurers best (because
those who don’t act so badly as to merit punitive damages get less benefit from
the cap).390

384
See, e.g., John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2446 (2003) (calling
“the rational basis test . . . the default position for judicial review of routine social and economic legislation
under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses”).
385
See, e.g., Amy Coney Barrett, Suspension and Delegation, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 251, 318 (2014) (“In
[the context of due process and equal protection review], certain types of laws—namely those restricting
fundamental rights or employing suspect classifications—merit heightened scrutiny because of the particular
constitutional guarantees they implicate.”).
386
See, e.g., Ex parte Adkins, 600 So. 2d 1067 (Ala. 1992); Reed v. Brunson, 527 So. 2d 102 (Ala.
1988); Home Indem. Co. v. Anders, 459 So. 2d 836 (Ala. 1984); Bowlin Horn v. Citizens Hosp., 425 So. 2d
1065 (Ala. 1982); Reese v. Rankin Fite Mem’l Hosp., 403 So. 2d 158 (Ala. 1981); Tyson v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp., 399 So. 2d 263 (Ala. 1981); Thompson v. Wiik, Reimer & Sweet, 391 So. 2d 1016 (Ala. 1980);
Mayo v. Rousselle Corp., 375 So. 2d 449 (Ala. 1979); Slagle v. Parker, 370 So. 2d 947 (Ala. 1979); Slagle v.
Reynolds Metals Co., 344 So. 2d 1216 (Ala. 1977); Sellers v. Edwards, 265 So. 2d 438 (Ala. 1972); Pickett v.
Matthews, 192 So. 261 (Ala. 1939); Martin’s Executrix v. Martin, 25 Ala. 201 (1854).
387
592 So. 2d 156 (Ala. 1991).
388
See id. at 157–58.
389
Id. at 166 (quoting City of Russellville v. Vulcan Materials Co., 382 So. 2d 525, 527 (Ala. 1980)).
390
Id. at 166–67.
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The legislature had included extensive findings in the statute itself—citing
a Government Accountability Office study and other sources to buttress a
claim that there was a health providers’ insurance crisis because of high tort
costs.391 But the court questioned those findings, stating that the correlation
between a damages cap and the reduction of health-care costs was, “at best,
indirect and remote,” while the burden imposed on injured individuals was
“direct and concrete. The hardship falls most heavily on those who are most
severely maltreated and, thus, most deserving of relief.”392
Moore seemed to herald a new age of strict review under equal protection
(which might be problematic for S.B. 413’s maximum contribution and payout
amounts).393 Moreover, the court stressed that it didn’t need to commit itself to
one of the formal tiers of traditional federal equal protection scrutiny (rational
basis, intermediate scrutiny, strict scrutiny) because it was applying the state
equal protection doctrine instead, and the state doctrine could be stricter than
the federal one.394 The trend continued in Smith v. Schulte395 and Ray v.
Anesthesia Associates.396
But in 1999 came Ex parte Melof.397 The statute there exempted certain
retired state employees from income tax on their state retirement benefits.398
The court upheld this against an equal protection challenge.399 Justice Houston

391

Id. at 167–68.
Id. at 168–69.
393
S. 413, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 8 (Ala. 2016).
394
Moore, 592 So. 2d at 170. Recall that this stricter state equal protection doctrine is without any actual
support in the text of the state constitution. See supra text accompanying note 379.
395
671 So. 2d 1334 (Ala. 1995) (striking down a statute capping the amounts recoverable in tort actions
against medical providers), abrogated by Ex parte Apicella, 809 So. 2d 865, 874 (Ala. 2001).
396
674 So. 2d 525 (Ala. 1995) (striking down a damages cap). In American Legion Post No. 57 v.
Leahey, 681 So. 2d 1337, 1338 (Ala. 1996), the court analyzed a statute allowing the defendant to introduce
evidence that the plaintiff received payments for medical expenses from a collateral source (i.e., abrogating the
“collateral source rule”). The court held that this statute abridged due process and equal protection. Id. at
1346–47. Because the statute treats the plaintiff and defendant differently, the jury might assume that the
plaintiff has more funds (since the defendant could now introduce evidence that he had received funds from a
collateral source). See id. at 1346. Alternatively, a wealthy plaintiff who’s self-insured wouldn’t be able to
show any collateral funds at all. But it violates equal protection to treat someone differently based on how
much money he has. Id. The statute also treats medical tortfeasors better than others, and malpractice victims
with insurance differently than others. Id. Moreover, since the statute gives the jury no guidance on how to
consider the evidence on funds from a collateral source, it invites arbitrary and unfair decisions in violation of
due process. See id. at 1347. But the court overruled American Legion soon afterward, in Marsh v. Green, 782
So. 2d 223, 233 (Ala. 2000). This may have implications for S.B. 413’s abrogation of the collateral source
rule. Ala. S. 413, § 6(f).
397
735 So. 2d 1172 (Ala. 1999).
398
Id. at 1173.
399
Id. at 1186.
392
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wrote the opinion, in which he also wrote—as he had been writing in dissents
for years—that there was no state equal protection clause.400
Justice Houston wrote for himself, and the other justices wrote separately.
Some believed there was a separate state equal protection doctrine;401 others
believed there was a state equal protection doctrine but it had exactly the same
content as the Federal Equal Protection Clause.402 There was certainly no
majority for Justice Houston’s strong view, and not all the justices were super
clear about their beliefs. In Hutchins v. DCH Regional Medical Center, the
court analyzed a statute providing that the jury in a med-mal case must be
instructed on the “substantial evidence” rule.403 The court said it was still an
open question whether there was a separate state equal protection doctrine, but
that it didn’t matter because (deferring to legislative judgment) the statute was
rational under either view.404
But various appellate courts have treated Melof as having held that there’s
no state equal protection doctrine.405 The infamous (twice-elected and twiceremoved) Chief Justice Roy Moore (probably no relation to Barbara Moore of
Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass’n) even enters the scene here, endorsing that
view of Melof in his separate opinion in Ex parte James.406 And very recently,
in Duran v. Buckner, an appellate court said that the effect of Melof has been
questioned, but that in any event, any state equal protection analysis is no
different than the federal equal protection analysis.407
The result is that there remains uncertainty about due process and equal
protection in Alabama. Probably a statute would be analyzed under the rational

400
Id. Obviously, the Federal Equal Protection Clause applies in every state. But denying that there is a
state equal protection doctrine implies that there can be no stricter state version, such as the version that the
court applied in Moore.
401
Id. at 1205 (Cook, J., concurring in the result, dissenting from the rationale); id. at 1205 (Johnstone,
J., dissenting).
402
Id. at 1188 (Maddox, J., concurring).
403
770 So. 2d 49 (Ala. 2000).
404
Id. at 59; see also Marsh v. Green, 782 So. 2d 223, 236 n.3 (Ala. 2000) (Cook, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (noting that “no fewer than 5 of the 8 [j]ustices participating in that decision expressed
either their disagreement with, or no opinion” as to Justice Houston’s opinion in Melof); Oblander v. USAA
Cas. Ins., 792 So. 2d 1103 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000) (saying the issue is disputed).
405
See Squires v. City of Saraland, 960 So. 2d 666 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007); M.E.T. v. M.F., 892 So. 2d
393 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003); Tomlin v. State, 909 So. 2d 213 (Ala. Crim. App. 2002), rev’d on other grounds,
909 So. 2d 283; M.V.S. v. V.M.D., 776 So. 2d 142 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999).
406
836 So. 2d 813, 842 (Ala. 2002) (per curiam) (Moore, C.J., concurring in the result in part and
dissenting in part).
407
157 So. 3d 956 (Ala. Civ. App. 2014).
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basis test and upheld without much fuss, but due process and equal protection
can always be used more strictly if some justices feel like doing so.
Just to be on the safe side, one might presume that the nondeferential
approach of Moore, Schulte, and Ray still holds and that the statute should
contain detailed findings documenting the extent of the problem and the
closeness of the relationship between the statutory scheme and the solution to
the problem.408
CONCLUSION
It’s already been well-known that tort law interacts with state constitutional
law since so many tort reforms have been struck down on state constitutional
grounds. That alone is good reason to be familiar with state con-law doctrines.
What’s less commonly appreciated is that state administrative law interacts
with tort and con law as well—because while many kinds of tort reform have
been struck down, the administrative, workers’-comp-like system for medical
malpractice claims may have a better chance of being upheld.
Of course, from a legal realist perspective, perhaps anti-tort-reform justices
will strike down any significant tort reform, and more radical reforms will
simply be struck down more decisively; while pro-tort-reform justices will
defer to the legislature and uphold legislative reforms. I can’t rule this out. But
this Article has proceeded on the premise, justified or not, that doctrine is
meaningful.
This hasn’t been a fifty-state survey, but it has focused on three states, in a
similar area of the country, where there has been substantial (and often
successful) con-law litigation challenging tort reform, and where med-mal
administrative compensation schemes have actually been introduced
legislatively. I’ve discussed three of the main doctrines that courts have used in
evaluating tort reforms—jury trial rights, access-to-courts rights, and due
process/equal protection rights—and compared them to the federal doctrines
where analogues exist. What emerges is that state courts have a hundred-yearlong history of discussing constitutional challenges to tort reforms, dating all
the way back to the adoption of workers’ comp laws. This is a rich source of
408
As mentioned above, see supra text accompanying notes 125, 283, 301–03, 305–07, 393, 396, three
sections—the statute of repose of section 5(c), the collateral-source offset of section 6(f), and the maximum
contribution and payout amounts of section 8—might call for greater findings (if they are to be included at all).
S. 413, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2016). Whatever findings strengthen the case under section 13 of the
constitution should also strengthen the case under due process/equal protection.
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case law, which ought to be studied and taught even beyond its immediate
applicability in debates over this specific tort reform.

